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Much of the debate over the impact of recent immigration in Western 
Europe and among its overseas offsprings on social cohesion and political 
stability rests on a profound misunderstanding: contrary to re-writings of history 
that represent cultural diversity as a departure from the norm, in reality 
heterogeneity was the more usual state of affairs, and the developmental path of 
the countries in question was shaped by the conflicts to which this gave rise as 
well as the resulting settlements. 
Although most of the societies in question consider themselves long-
established “nations,” it should be remembered that although the striving to 
elaborate distinct proto-national cultures built around the myth of a common 
descent from ancient ancestors and expressed by way of a distinct language 
originated in the kingdoms of England and France as early as the thirteenth 
century, it was not fulfilled until the late nineteenth, and in most cases quite 
imperfectly, as the resulting states remained retained sizeable territorially 
concentrated (i.e., regional) population groups with distinctive “ethnic” identities, 
often based on language -- notably Bretons, Alsatians, and Corsicans in France; 
Scots, Welsh, and Irish in the United Kingdom; Catalans and Basques in Spain.  
Another major source of difference was religion.  The rulers of Spain and 
Portugal expended considerable effort in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries on 
eliminating the remaining islands of Muslim and Jewish culture, reconstructing 
differences of faith into differences of “blood” and pursuing policies that resulted 
in effect in “ethnic cleansing”.  Even as religious homogeneity was being 
achieved in the south,  in northern Europe Protestant challenges to the authority   2
of Rome triggered a century and a half of widespread conflict, ultimately settled 
by way of the rule of cuius regio, eius religio, whereby inhabitants of a given 
territory must adopt the ruler’s religion. This too generated massive flows of 
refugees –indeed, the word itself came into the French language and 
subsequently into English as a result of these very experiences.  Concomitantly, 
these refugees contributed to ethnic diversity among the receiving countries, as 
denoted by the incidence of French names in England, Sweden, and Prussia, or 
of Irish names in Spain and Latin America.  Germany, which was unified only in 
the late nineteenth century, was in effect a Protestant country with a large 
Roman Catholic minority, consisting in part of Polish-speaking Slavs.  The 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, as constituted after the Napoleonic wars, was about 
evenly divided between Protestants and Roman Catholics, with the latter further 
divided between Dutch / Flemish and Walloon / French speakers; there was also 
a linguistically distinct group in Friesland.  When the southern provinces broke 
away in 1830, the Netherlands remained heterogeneous with regard to religion, 
while the new kingdom of Belgium was entirely Roman Catholic but sharply 
divided along linguistic lines, a feature that has dominated its political life to this 
day. Significant linguistic differences persisted in Spain as well.  
In the aftermath of the Enlightenment, struggles over role of religion itself, 
especially in Catholic countries, gave rise to new differentiations of a more 
political nature between those advocating an official role for religion in the state, 
and those taking the opposite tack. Settlement of French revolutionary upheavals 
by way of the Napoleonic Concordat established in France in early nineteenth 
century reserved for the Catholic church a special place within the state, but led 
to struggle throughout nineteenth and first half of twentieth. This led to cleavages 
in Catholic countries such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, France, Belgium, which 
played a major role in shaping emergence of political parties during 
democratization, and in most cases persisted until quite recently. The outcome 
was usually separation of Church and State, which did not mean reducing the 
importance of the Church; in France, the Concordat structure persists, with the 
state expecting major religious bodies to be constituted as interlocutors.  The   3
United States also separated church and state, but as part of struggle for 
independence from Britain, and its version places less emphasis on “secularism” 
than the French.  Religious organizations came to constitute vital components of 
civil society, a development which probably helps explain the distinctive 
persistence of  religiosity among the U.S. public, in contrast with Europe. 
These religious and linguistic divisions tended to become politicized in the 
age of democratization, and played a significant role in shaping the relevant 
countries’ institutions.  A number of European countries also contained marginal 
populations that differed from the mainstream by their way of life, notably 
nomadic Roma and “indigenous” Saami in northern Scandinavia, and whose 
status remained largely unsettled. 
Contrary to another historical fiction, throughout these centuries  most 
European countries also received considerable flows of immigrants (Moch 1992; 
Zolberg 1978; Zolberg 1978). As already noted, some of these arose from 
religious persecutions; but in addition, there were all along considerable 
migrations driven by economic necessity, notably the deterioration and the 
consolidation of agricultural lands,  vastly accelerated by the onset of the 
industrial age.  These movements occurred both within and between countries, 
and while overseas migrations have drawn considerable attention, many 
transnational movements occurred within Europe itself as well.  France, in 
particular, having experienced a sharp drop in fertility in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, drew considerable flows from neighboring Italy, Spain, and 
Belgium and, by the turn of the twentieth century, also from more distant Poland.  
The industrial, mining, and commercial agricultural regions of Germany also drew 
large numbers of Poles from the late nineteenth century onward.  Industrial 
Britain drew heavily on the southern Irish as its “industrial labor reserve”; since 
the entire island was then part of the United Kingdom, this was an “internal” 
rather than “international” migration, but the Irish Catholic and Celtic-speech 
migrants were regarded by the receiving communities as “strangers” rather than 
as co-nationals. Similarly, within Belgium, there was considerable movement of 
Flemish-speakers to the Walloon industrial and mining centers as well as to the   4
capital region, which was then largely French-speaking. In the same vein, a large 
part of the westward moving Jewish emigration from Eastern Europe in the late 
nineteenth century landed in Western Europe rather than overseas, and triggered 
a new and more acute form of anti-semitism, which culminated in a tragic form of 
“ethnic cleansing” in the mid-twentieth. 
Similar patterns emerged in North America as well.  As is well known, at 
the time of its founding, the United States was sharply divided between North 
and South, which were differentiated by their economic structure, legal systems,  
as well as cultural orientations and traditions.  There were further cultural 
differentiations within both regions, for example French Catholic Louisiana within 
the South, and Germanic Pennsylvania within the North.  Despite efforts by 
American ruling  elites to secure mostly Protestant and “Anglo-Saxon” 
immigrants, subsequent waves were much more heterogeneous with regard to 
both language and religion.  However, the original cultural differentiation led to a 
bloody Civil War, and in its wake, there were more self-conscious efforts to limit 
immigration to what were considered “desirable” groups, leading eventually to the 
outright exclusion of Asians and the severe restriction of eastern and southern 
Europeans.  Concurrently, African Americans, hitherto largely confined to the 
South, were massively drawn to the industrializing north and emerged as a major 
presence in its cities in the mid-twentieth century; southern whites moved for 
similar reasons, as did much of the population of the Midwestern plains.   
Canada, originally a French colonial undertaking, was conquered by 
Britain in the latter part of the eighteenth century and following an abortive 
uprising by the population of French descent in the 1830s, deliberate efforts were 
made to overwhelm them demographically by way of immigration  as well as 
institutionally, resulting eventually in the formation of a heterogeneous British-
dominated confederation. In both the United States and Canada, indigenous 
peoples managed to survive successive attempts to eliminate or absorb them, 
and to retain enough of a collective identity to provide the basis for claims to 
some form of institutional recognition.  Moreover, after a protracted period of very 
limited immigration in the middle decades of the twentieth centuries, incoming   5
flows resumed with a sharp shift of their sources from Europe to other parts of 
the world –mostly Asia and the Caribbean in the case of Canada, and in addition 
Latin America and to some extent Africa in the case of the United States.  
Following the fall of the European Communist regimes, which had generally 
maintained severe prohibitions against exit, Central and East Europeans were 
added as well.  Consequently, even these “traditional immigration countries” 
began to face what they perceived as new challenges of unprecedented 
diversity. 
What is different today, however, is not so much the advent of diversity, 
but rather the changed circumstances under which it is taking place.  Although 
the emphasis is often placed on the fact that the new differences are “wider,” in 
the sense that the new immigrants, originating in more distant parts of the world 
and often from what are loosely reckoned as different “races,” differ to a greater 
extent from the receivers than earlier waves or than the various internal groups 
noted, this is an historical distortion.  In many cases, earlier immigrants were also 
perceived as belonging to different and usually inferior “races,” as was the case 
of the Irish in Britain and America, of east European Jews on both sides of the 
Atlantic, and of southern and eastern Europeans in North America.  A distinctive 
feature of today’s situation is that the differences are emerging  under social and 
political conditions that render some of the older responses unfeasible, either 
because they are impractical or because they are ruled out by the receivers’ 
institutionalized obligation to respect human rights. 
While much of the concern among the receivers arises from the 
immigrants’ distinct “ancestry,” which is commonly believed to imply certain 
cultural and behavioral dispositions, biological origins are of themselves quite 
irrelevant to social life.  What does matter are concrete cultural differences, 
among which religion and language are most prominent.  In this perspective, past 
experiences of diversity are relevant not only to set the historical record straight –
although this is important in itself, as acceptance of diversity as a “fact of life” will 
contribute to the reduction of social tensions and the political extremism they   6
feed, and awareness that the societies in question faced earlier challenges of this 
sort should enhance confidence in their capacity to deal with such matters today. 
Moreover, management of the old differences generated dynamics that 
still play an important part in the political life of their societies. For example, 
confrontations between speakers of the two national languages brought about a 
major constitutional transformation of Belgium in the 1970s, and continue to 
affect the composition of its governments and its approach to a variety of 
policies; this was the case also in Spain, where some Basque elements continue 
to challenge the recent settlement; the United Kingdom has also taken some 
steps toward regional devolution to the benefit of Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland, with the latter still unsettled; and Canada has also undergone major 
constitutional transformations. Equally important, the mode of settlement of past 
issues arising from cultural diversity produced an institutional legacy that which 
shapes to a considerable extent contemporary responses, in accordance with a 
process social scientists term “parth dependency.”  For example, France’s 
anxious response to the wearing of a headdress by Muslim schoolgirls and its 
attempt to construct what is in effect a “Muslim national church” –discussed in 
detail below— arise from the application of “principles” established in the course 
of past struggles between the secularizing state and the Roman Catholic church. 
Although the literature dealing with these matters usually emphasizes 
distinctions between policies that respectively emphasize “assimilation,” 
“differentialism,” or “multiculturalism” (Inglis 1997), this paper argues that in 
practice, policies necessarily involve a combination of elements from all of three 
positions  because the major features that enter into the composition of a group’s 
identity, notably religion, language, and social traditions, cannot be dealt with in 
the same manner.  Moreover, regardless of their legal traditions, receivers are 
constrained by contemporary international standards of fairness and conceptions 
of rights –sometimes formalized by way of adherence to certain treaties-- to 
adopt generous policies of access to citizenship.  Hence while the approaches of 
different states to incorporation are largely shaped by past experiences in dealing 
with cultural differences, the constraints arising from the practical implications of   7
religion and language combine with those imposed by contemporary standards of 
justice and fairness on cultural matters and citizenship to induce considerable 
convergence among them. 
 
PART ONE: THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF HISTORICAL PATTERNS 
 
1. Religious Diversity: 
Religion, especially as it is practiced in contemporary societies, is not 
merely a matter of personal faith, but is usually embedded in distinctive and 
bounded institutions.  Its materialization in the public sphere involves worship, 
usually in dedicated buildings on prescribed holidays and at specified times, and 
the organization of religious bureaucracies and membership-based 
congregations to manage these matters. In some cases it also encompasses 
distinctive dietary practices, which usually involve the procurement of 
appropriately prepared foods and insuring their availability in public facilities such 
as school and factory lunchrooms, as well as dress codes, which may clash with 
mainstream ones (for example, the covering of head hair and  prohibitions on the 
display of body parts considered indecent).  Religion often also entails distinctive 
prescriptions governing the family as well as the comportment of men and 
women; and where this is the case, parents are concerned that the schools 
reinforce the appropriate norms and provide suitably different activities or even 
programs for boys and girls. 
On both sides of the Atlantic, existing institutional arrangements governing 
religion reflect the historical settlement of controversies arising from religious 
diversity and secularization, as well as the outcome of earlier encounters with 
immigrant religions --notably Roman Catholicism in the United States from about 
1830 on, and Judaism on both sides of the Atlantic from approximately the same 
period onward (Gleason 1987; Vetvik 1992; Birnbaum & Katznelson 1995). 
(Koenig 2003). Nevertheless, progress in making fredom of worship a reality 
rather than a theory has been remarkably slow. For example, non-Catholic 
Christian denominations were recognized in Italy only in 1984 and in Spain in   8
1992.  Moreover, the continuing strength of a dominant church or churches, and 
their historical contribution to the shaping of public culture by way of holidays and 
rituals, for example, can be construed by immigrants at the individual level as 
pressure to conform in one way or another to the majority religious culture. At the 
level of the collectivity, conditions for incorporation of the newcomer religion into 
existing arrangements usually reflect expectations that it will evolve toward the 
organizational model similar to that of the majority religions, e.g. into an 
ecclesiastical hierarchy in Roman Catholic or Lutheran European countries, or 
alternately, into a decentralized congeries of congregations in the United States. 
The state’s “neutrality,” which allows religious immigrants to organize 
themselves, but only if they do so in tacit or even explicit conformity with 
indigenous models, amounts to a policy of attenuated assimilation. In some 
countries, this is a fairly recent development: in France, for example, the 
requirement that in order to qualify for authorization and the possibility of state 
subsidies, NGOs must include a minimum number of citizens in their leadership, 
was clearly an obstacle for many immigrant groups, notably religious ones, and 
was abolished only in 1981 (Kastoryano 2002).  This is further manifested in 
provisions for access to public funding, if at all available, that is limited to cultural, 
education and sporting activities rather than for strictly religious activities. 
All the societies under consideration had to deal with the place of religion 
in public life in the course of their political development, giving rise to three major 
patterns:   
1. Established  church: This was the baseline situation across the board. 
Following the emergence of Christianity as the dominant religion, 
minorities (residual “pagans,” Muslims, Jews) were either converted or 
physically eliminated (massacred, expelled); but the differences that 
emerged within Christianity itself  --first Byzantium vs. Rome, and 
subsequently within Roman Christianity, between Roman Catholicism and 
various forms of Protestantism— subsequently affected state-formation as 
well. By and large, rulers identified with a particular Christian church and 
generally imposed this choice on their subjects. France was torn by   9
religious wars for nearly a century, with the Roman Catholic side emerging 
victorious in the early seventeenth century; subsequently, His Most 
Catholic Majesty King Louis XIV resorted to “religious cleansing” to 
eliminate remaining Calvinist Protestants (“Huguenots”) from his realm.  
Yet at the same time that he eliminated the Huguenots, Louis XIV 
acquired Alsace, whose population was in part Lutheran as well as 
Jewish, and was obligated by the acquisition treaty to concede them 
religious freedom, thus contributing to a renewal of diversity. In the United 
Kingdom, following severe upheavals for most of the seventeenth century, 
the Anglican Church was established in England and Wales while the 
Presbyterian Church was established in Scotland and  Roman Catholics 
were deprived of rights,  including the majority population in Ireland.  Most 
Scandinavian countries fit this model as well. Established religions 
benefited from state support and in most instances, dominated the 
educational and the embryonic welfare system.  Although in most 
instances members of minority faiths were granted civil rights in the 
course of the nineteenth century, their religious institutions and schools 
did not benefit from state support. 
2. Consociational  Pillarization:  In some countries with relatively large 
religious minorities, notably the Netherlands, nineteenth-century political 
confrontations resulted in a settlement providing state support to the 
principal churches on the basis of parity (Lijphart 1977).  This arrangement 
in turn fostered the organization of separate education and welfare 
systems, often encompassing a vast range of voluntary and non-
government organizations.  Similar institutional arrangements were 
established in post-World War II West Germany, where for example 
taxpayers indicate to which religious organization they want to contribute, 
and the state in turn supports the different faiths.  In a number of Catholic 
countries, this approach also governed the settlement of confrontations 
between “clerical” and “anti-clerical” camps (Belgium, Austria; Spain, 
Portugal). Where this pattern has been institutionalized, the emergence of   10
new faiths raises poses the issue of whether they will be accorded parity 
on the same basis as the historically established ones. 
3. Separation  of  Church and State:  In the aftermath of the Enlightenment, 
struggles over the role of religion itself, especially in Catholic countries, 
gave rise to a new differentiation of a more political nature, betweent those 
advocating an official role for religion within the state, and those taking the 
opposite tack. Settlement of French revolutionary upheavals by way of the 
Napoleonic Concordat established in early nineteenth century France a 
special place for the Catholic church within the state, but led to a struggle 
over this issue through the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth.  
Similar cleavages emerged in Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Belgium, playing 
a major role in shaping the configuration of political parties in the course of 
democratization.  The outcome was usually separation of Church and 
State. This did not necessarily signify a lowering of the importance of the 
church. In France, Concordat structures in effect persist, with the state 
expecting major religious bodies to be constituted as official interlocutors.  
Moreover, the state insisted on maintaining a supervisory function so that, 
in practice, constituted religious bodies must meet its approval.   
In contrast, American separation arose from the colonial conflict with 
Britain, including with its established Anglican church, and was also a 
response to the wide variety of churches that arose in the new land, partly 
as a consequence of flight from persecution by religious minorities. In 
effect, separation combined a strict avoidance of state support for religious 
institutions with considerable freedom for the organization of religious 
bodies and a generally benevolent stance toward faith itself –as 
expressed, for example, in the proclamation on the national currency, “In 
God we trust.” Accordingly, the religious sphere is genuinely “anarchic” 
(i.e., devoid of governance): there are no legal impediments to the 
emergence of new faiths and their public manifestations. 
 
2. Linguistic Diversity:   11
The logic of language as embedded in social and cultural institutions 
differs sensibly from what one might expect on the basis of innate human abilities 
and inclinations. Any human being who is capable of speech can learn to speak 
in more than one tongue; and this capacity is cumulative, in that the acquisition of 
a new language does not occasion the loss of the old. Accordingly, widespread 
multi-lingualism is common in many societies, historical as well as contemporary. 
Yet the host countries on both sides of the Atlantic are firmly committed to 
achieve and maintain the paramountcy of one --or in a few cases, several-- 
national languages. Thus, despite the cumulative linguistic capacity of 
individuals, in the western world generally language provides the principal 
foundation for the formation of  bounded and mutually exclusive national groups, 
thereby paralleling the institutionalization of religion (de Swaan 1993a; de Swaan 
1993b). 
However, the materialization of language in the public sphere takes very 
different forms from that of religion. To begin with, because communications, in 
order to be intelligible, must be expressed in linguistically specific ways, in the 
course of carrying out its activities the state necessarily engages in linguistic 
choices. It can make itself blind --to religion, race, ethnicity-- but it cannot choose 
to become deaf or mute; institutionally speaking, there cannot be an equivalent to 
the separation of Church and State, with language relegated to the private 
sphere and the state adopting a “neutral” stance. The state’s choices in turn 
affect the value of the linguistic capital of various groups in the population, 
including immigrants whose original language differs from that of the hosts.  
By and large, these considerations are applicable also to the institutional 
spheres that pertain to making a living. The coming of the post-industrial age, 
involving an accelerated shift from work in agriculture and industry to the “white 
collar” sector and beyond, has decisively enhanced the importance of language 
skills in the labor market; and since these skills are in large part language-
specific --an employee’s success depends not merely on how well she reads and 
writes, but how well she reads and writes French, or Dutch -- the linguistic 
regulations and practices that prevail in the labor market become more important   12
as well, because they decisively affects the value of one’s linguistic capital. This 
is true also in the sphere of education, which determines access to the labor 
market for new generations.  The advent of the information age will undoubtedly 
further modify these conditions, but so far specific language remains vital. 
Whereas it is possible for a state to adopt a neutral stance with 
regard to a variety of religions, or to make itself blind to ancestry, it cannot 
choose to become mute or deaf. Because of the widespread belief that 
language differences are a source of political instability and societal 
conflict, as well as that they constitute an economic liability, policies are 
commonly designed to reduce the actual diversity encountered among the 
population and to minimize its potential growth. This reductive tendency is 
reinforced by the costs of multilingual services and institutions. 
Consequently, over three-quarters of the world’s countries have central 
governments that are officially or effectively unilingual; but half of them 
contain linguistic minorities of 10 percent or more; and in about one-third 
of the cases, a majority of the inhabitants do not use the official language 
as their everyday speech. Even where central governments are officially 
multilingual, the languages recognized rarely encompass the full range of 
everyday speeches used by the population (Laponce 1987:95-102). 
Most important, whereas their commitment to freedom of religion obligates 
liberal states to go beyond respect for the rights of individuals and accept, or 
sometimes even positively sustain, a measure of institutional pluralism in the 
religious sphere, no such obligation arises in connection with “freedom of 
speech,” which is generally construed to refer primarily to the contents of speech 
(broadly speaking) rather than choice of linguistic vehicle. Accordingly, the 
sphere of “language rights” is more limited than that of “religious rights.” For 
example, in Australia and Canada, which have explicitly endorsed “multi-
culturalism,” the application of this approach to language does not entail the 
abandonment of basic education in English (or French, in the case of Quebec), 
but merely a commitment to provide instruction in the immigrant child’s home 
language as a supplementary –i.e., “foreign”-- language (Inglis 1997:30).   13
In Europe, linguistic matters moved to the fore as rival states sought to 
transform their populations into “nations” sharing a distinctive identity (Anderson 
1983; Gellner 1983). Vastly facilitated by the advent of printing in the late 
fifteenth century, nation-building led to the fragmentation of the Church of Rome 
into national Protestant denominations or national Catholic segments, served by 
sacred texts translated into the vernaculars of the various courts. The norm of 
linguistic monism was firmly institutionalized as an adjunct of monarchical 
absolutism, which also encouraged the elaboration of literatures dedicated to the 
legitimation of royal authority. State expansion by way of the incorporation of 
peripheries or of adjoining foreign territories, the advent of mass armies, 
democratization, and industrialization, rendered linguistic unification ever more 
urgent. 
In the French historical tradition, for example, the emergence of the Île de 
France’s vernacular as the language of state is associated with the Oath of 
Strasburg (842), marking the formation of stable boundaries between the rival 
kingdoms issued from Charlemagne’s empire (Nordman 1998:446-47). The 
French language accompanied the spread of royal authority. In 1539 the edict of 
Villers-Cotterêts prohibited the use of Latin in law and administration and 
imposed the use of “French maternal speech” in its stead. Although this left room 
for the use of regional vernaculars in local affairs, subsequent edicts proclaimed 
after the annexation of additional “foreign” provinces imposed on them the 
exclusive use of French. Concurrently, the state engineered the standardization 
of French by creating an academy to that effect. Nevertheless, at the time of the 
revolution, only one-fourth of the population spoke French as its usual language. 
The revolutionary leadership initially attempted to mobilize the citizenry by way of 
the vernaculars, but in the face of local resistance these were declared to be 
tainted by Ancien Régime norms. Moreover, the persistence of peripheral 
languages related to those of counter-revolutionary neighbors was deemed a 
security risk. Ignorance of French also hampered the effective deployment of 
mass armies. Consequently, the government launched unprecedented efforts to 
impose French as the exclusive language of public and private affairs down to   14
the most local level (de Certeau, et al. 1975). The discovery half a century later 
that one-fourth of the population still did not use French in ordinary life prompted 
renewed concerns with political stability as well as national security, and 
ignorance of French was now seen also as an obstacle to economic 
modernization. This led to the elaboration of a comprehensive and centralized 
system of primary education, which emphasized mastery of the national 
language and the repression of regional tongues; however, this was combined 
with a glorification of France’s regional diversity, in which the regions were seen 
as “destined” to become part of France (Weber 1976; Thiesse 2000).  
Parallel developments took place in England, where the triumph of English 
within the royal state is associated with the victory at Agincourt (1415), marking 
the country’s definitive defeat of French dynastic claims, as celebrated in 
Shakespeare’s Henry V (Dillard 1985:6-7). In the same vein, the break from 
Rome in the sixteenth century was accompanied by the translation of the Bible 
into “the king’s English.” Although linguistic unity progressed rapidly within 
England itself, the subsequent formation of Great Britain and of the United 
Kingdom generated new diversity, which policy-makers episodically undertook to 
reduce until well into the twentieth century (Colley 1992:11-18). French and 
British policies toward their respective Celtic peripheries –Brittany in the one 
case, Wales and Ireland in the other-- were strikingly similar, and despite major 
differences in their strategies of colonial rule, both states also adopted analogous 
language policies with regard to central administration and the education of 
indigenous elites. 
Aided by the advent of the printing press, from the sixteenth century 
onward, rulers of the emerging European states undertook to establish a single 
language, distinctive from that of their neighbors,  as the exclusive means of 
communication between the state and its subjects throughout the realm (Febvre 
& Martin 1971; Anderson 1983); and over subsequent centuries, the national 
culture penetrated steadily downward along with the spreading literacy.  Whereas 
in the course of liberalization states gradually relinquished the notion that a 
common religion was a sine qua non for national integration and survival, the   15
opposite occurred with regard to language, which steadily moved to the fore as 
the single most important element in the construction of national identity, both 
positively as a communicative instrument shared by members of the “nation,” and 
as a boundary marker affirming their distinction from others.  Thus, as the result 
of deliberate state action as well as of the dynamics of “cultural capital” (Bourdieu 
1984), monolingualism became the norm throughout the economy and much of 
civil society as well.  
In a few exceptional cases, where a sizeable segment of the elite or of the 
historically resident population at large spoke other languages, this gave rise to a 
protracted struggle on behalf of their recognition in specified spheres, notably 
state services, justice, education, and eventually work (Zolberg 1974).  Some of 
them achieved a status akin to that of “minority” religions in the form of regional 
bilingualism (e.g., Saami in northern Norway, German in Italy’s Alto Adige), and 
in rare instances, parity (Belgium, Switzerland, Canada).  Overall, where it exists, 
linguistic pluralism has come about exclusively as the result of political 
settlements among indigenous groups – notably a condition for the 
amalgamation of diverse cantons into the Helvetic Conferederation, a century-
long struggle on the part of Belgian speakers of Flemish / Dutch with their French 
/ Walloon compatriots for full national bilingualism, recognition of Catalan as a 
legal provincial language in Spain.  
By virtue of the hegemonic position the states of Western Europe 
achieved in the modern world system, linguistic unity came to be equated with 
modernity and emerged as a global norm that shaped policy among the states 
arising from European settlement in the Americas and Oceania, notably the 
United States, where the founders expressed concern over the persistence of 
German-speaking communities, as well as among the modernizing empires of 
the European periphery and, later on, the post-colonial states of Asia and Africa.
2 
Paradoxically, however, Europe’s equation of state with nation encouraged 
distinct language groups to challenge established states on the grounds that they 
were entitled to political autonomy.   16
Although language has long been of concern to states because of its 
instrumental and symbolic functions, issues of language policy have recently 
achieved unprecedented prominence as a concomitant of the expansion of 
governmental activity and of citizen participation, as well as of the advent of post-
industrial conditions that enhance the value of linguistic skills (Bell 1973). Among 
older self-acknowledged multilingual countries such as Belgium, Switzerland, and 
Canada, historical arrangements reflecting earlier power relationships between 
the groups have been called into question. This is true also of situations involving 
surviving indigenous minorities such as the Saami in Norway and Native 
Americans in Canada, the United States, or the Pacific region.  
A basic policy choice is whether or not to declare one or more languages 
“official.” Among older states in which one language was clearly dominant, as in 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, or the United States at the time of the 
founding, the default stance was silence, reflecting the fact that the language’s 
hegemonic status was taken for granted. In relation to this baseline, the 
specification of an official language expresses determination to maintain or 
reinstate the status quo in the face of changing practices or perceived 
challenges. In this vein, in the last two decades of the twentieth century, 
approximately half the states of the United States adopted laws or constitutional 
amendments declaring English their official languages, and there were efforts to 
enact a constitutional amendment to that effect at the national level as well. In 
1992 the French government also initiated a constitutional amendment 
establishing French as the national language.  Among multilingual states, 
officialization, which usually involves an invidious distinction between privileged 
languages and others, signifies the establishment of a language regime providing 
general rules for policy-making. 
Whether or not a regime has been formally established, language policy 
involves at the minimum a determination of the language(s) in which public 
services are provided, ranging from the posting of street signs to the educational 
system and law-enforcement; of the linguistic qualifications of the appropriate 
officials and government employees; of the language(s) in which citizens can   17
exercise their rights, notably voting, contacting representatives or officials, or 
defending themselves against charges; and of the language(s) in which citizens 
are expected to exercise their obligations, such as military service, paying taxes, 
or maintaining business records subject to inspection.  Language policy usually 
extends also to the specification of criteria for membership in the society, as 
expressed in linguistic requirements for naturalization and occasionally for 
immigration itself.  Beyond this, the advent of the welfare state has drawn 
government deeply into the private sector, notably to monitor the appropriateness 
of language requirements for various types of employment and to insure the 
availability of consumer information, such as labels, to the several language 
communities. State intervention may extend to the regulation of language use in 
printed and electronic media, and even in private speech. The persecution of 
human beings merely for speaking their mother tongue is an extreme but 
unfortunately not uncommon manifestation of language policy. 
In all types of states and at all levels of governance, language policy is 
often acutely controversial because almost any institutional arrangement entails 
an uneven distribution of costs to the individuals affected, considered as 
members of distinct language groups (Pool 1991; De Swaan 1991).The costs are 
both economic and psychological because language not only carries 
considerable weight as capital in the determination of socio-economic status 
(Bourdieu 1979), but is intimately linked to the formation of personal and 
collective identities. Overall, language institutions reflect prevailing class and 
majority-minority relations. The development of policy in this as in other spheres 
tends to be path-dependent: established conceptualizations, power relationships, 
and institutional arrangements, set a course from which it is difficult to depart; 
consequently, there is likely to be a considerable discrepancy between political 
and social conditions at the time these institutions were established and the 
present, Understandably, challenges to the status quo tend to arise from efforts 
by the disadvantaged to lessen the costs they bear.  Characteristically, the 
resulting confrontations take on the features of a constant-sum game, even if the 
proposed policies do not impose very great economic costs on the larger   18
community, because those who hold the upper hand perceive the change as a 
decline of hegemony; relatively moderate costs may be inflated, and the new 
situation magnified into a threat to the community’s integrity. 
Patterns of language policy arises in the first instance from a population’s 
actual socio-linguistic configuration, itself shaped by past policies. Relevant 
aspects include not only the number of languages and the size of the groups, but 
also their spatial distribution (territorially concentrated vs. dispersed); their socio-
political power (languages that have achieved written form and are used in 
government, business, and science vs. others); and whether the relevant groups 
are native or immigrant. Other significant elements of the socio-linguistic 
configuration include the language groups’ location in relation to the poles of 
political and economic development (center vs. periphery), as well as the 
relationship of language differentiation to the overall stratification system and 
other cultural signifiers, notably religion and physical appearance (Laponce 
1987:120-35). 
Another weighty factor is linguistic culture, the set of behaviors and beliefs 
a speech community has about its own language and the others with which it 
comes into contact; when political aspects are emphasized, this may be termed 
linguistic ideology (Schiffman 1996:5; Stevens 1999). The culture or ideology of 
the dominant group(s) naturally carries extensive weight in the determination of 
policy. A case in point noted earlier is the attitude of the French revolutionary 
leadership toward regional languages.  Of special import with regard to policy-
making in the contemporary period are the cognitive elements of linguistic 
culture, notably scientific discourse. For example, in the early twentieth century, 
British psychologists announced that bilingualism interfered with the development 
of intelligence. Reached on the basis of studies of Welsh children, their findings 
supported the maintenance of an educational system that brutally suppressed 
Celtic speech on behalf of total immersion in English.  The harmfulness of 
bilingualism was subsequently confirmed by American psychologists 
investigating Japanese children in California and immigrant European children in 
New York, with similar educational implications. This theory prevailed until the   19
1960s, when  Canadian research, undertaken in the context of a reformist 
national administration more responsive to French-speakers’ grievances, not only 
exposed the studies on which it had been based as deeply flawed, but suggested 
instead that bilingualism produced beneficial effects (Hakuta 1986:14-27). The 
new theory was quickly invoked by Hispanic advocates of bilingual education in 
the emerging U.S. debate on the subject. 
Language policy varies also as a function of the general political regime. 
As noted earlier, the historical expansion of political participation to encompass 
the more modest strata of the population generally imparted to language 
minorities greater weight in the political arena.  This fostered demands to lower 
what they perceived as an unduly large share of language costs, by providing 
public services in additional languages as well as reducing or eliminating 
linguistic obstacles to upward mobility by way of education. Similar processes 
arise among hitherto authoritarian countries in the course of democratization. 
Another important regime variable is its degree of centralization. By virtue of the 
prevailing normative equation “language=nation,”  demands for greater equity 
tend to engender, sooner or later, aspirations to greater political autonomy, which 
are much easier to fulfill within a federalist framework (Switzerland, Canada) than 
a unitary one. Indeed, democratization has had the effect of moving hitherto 
centralized multilingual societies with spatially concentrated groups toward 
federalism (Belgium, post-Franco Spain). Devolution of authority to the regional 
level with concomitant control over linguistic policy generally statisfies demands 
for autonomy (Fishman 1986), but separatist aspirations may persist 
(e.g.,Quebec), although they have not resulted in the breakup of existing states. 
The political dynamics arising from linguistic diversity and the accommodations to 
which they lead can be illustrated by the cases of Belgium and Canada.  
BELGIUM: Issued from the vagaries of Europe’s dynastic tribulations and 
united by the Roman Catholic religion, the Kingdom of Belgium straddles the 
long-established boundary zone between Germanic and Romance languages.  
Around the time of the state’s founding in 1830, approximately 60 percent of 
Belgians, concentrated in the north, spoke varieties of Flemish, closely related to   20
Dutch; and another 30 percent, concentrated in the south, used mostly varieties 
of Walloon, a group of Romance speeches with more Germanic root words than 
standard French. However, following the introduction of French as a language of 
state by their Austrian Habsburg rulers in the eighteenth century and the 
subsequent annexation of the Belgian provinces by revolutionary France, the 
traditional elites of both regions, amounting to perhaps 10 percent of the 
population altogether, had by then mostly adopted French as their usual 
language. It is therefore hardly surprising that the founding elites unhesitatingly 
imposed French as the country’s sole official language. French exclusively was 
used in government as well as secondary and higher education, limiting Flemish 
to local administration and terminal elementary education in the north, and 
relegating Walloon to the margin. The capital city, albeit situated within the 
Flemish region, functioned as a French-speaking transmission center. The 
resulting linguistic inequality was compounded by th location of the coalmines 
that stimulated the country’s precocious industrialization were located in the 
south. Hence until well into the twentieth century, Flemings striving for upward 
mobility had no choice but to learn French, and in time many of them abandoned 
their ancestral language altogether  (Zolberg 1974). 
Demands for change arose in the second half of the nineteenth century 
from the ranks of the Flemish region’s expanding middle class, severely 
disadvantaged by the burden of having to function in French rather than in their 
mother tongue. Initially demaqnding recognition of Flanders itself as a bilingual 
region, they subsequently shifted to the establishment of official bilingualism at 
the national level. This was formally achieved in 1897.  Nevertheless, Flemish 
retained in effect second-class status; most notably, university education 
continued to be conducted exclusively in French, and French remained the 
language of command in the army.  In the early decades of the twentieth century, 
the more radical wing of the Flemish movement took on a nationalist cast, 
demanding the establishment of a federal system; a few even advocated 
secession, possibly followed by reunion with the Netherlands. However, Flemish 
nationalism was tarnished by its association with German occupation in the two   21
world wars. In the mid-1930s, a language settlement was achieved whereby the 
country was divided into two unilingual regions, with a bilingual capital district and 
national administration; as part of this, the state university at Ghent was 
converted into a Flemish-language institution. However, language conflict 
returned to the fore in the post-World War II period, and Flemish power increased 
as the economic standing of the regions reversed. After a lengthy period of 
perennial low-level conflict, in the 1970s Belgium finally transformed itself into a 
complex federal system, with a language regime founded on dual 
monolingualism rather than bilingualism. The country was divided into two 
regions and Brussels with regard to economic decision-making, as well as into 
linguistic / cultural communities (Flemish, French, and a small German one) ) 
with regard to educational and cultural policy.  Parity prevailed at the center, with 
a mandatory equal number of cabinet posts allocated to each of the two major 
communities and parallel administrative services in the two languages (Zolberg 
1976; Witte & Craeybeckx 1987:423-518). 
CANADA: Paralleling the status of Flemish in Belgium, Quebec French 
was long associated with backwardness in the eyes of Canadian officials and 
English-speaking businessmen, as well as their U.S. neighbors, despite the near-
identity of its written form with standard French. Paradoxically, however, the 
conquered French Canadians fared better under Protestant British imperial 
authorities than the Flemings at the hands of their own countrymen. As part of 
the post-conquest settlement, in an attempt to secure French Canadian loyalties 
in the impending conflict with the unruly American colonies, the British granted 
the Roman Catholic church and the Province of Quebec a considerable degree 
of autonomy. This enabled French Canadians to create from the very outset 
institutions of secondary and higher education that enabled them to form a 
professional middle class in their own language. Although many educated 
québécois learned English, outright language shift occurred only among those 
who left the province. After a period of direct rule imposed in the wake of proto-
nationalist agitation, the establishment of the Confederation in 1867 accorded 
Quebec along with the other provinces a degree of self-government long   22
unthinkable in centralized Belgium (Latouche 1977). Consequently, around the 
turn of the twentieth century French Canada possessed many more of the 
elements of a distinct society than did Belgian Flanders.  Nevertheless, in the 
1960s, lingering insecurity concerning the survival of Quebec’s distinctive culture 
within the anglophonic North American environment stimulated a movement for 
outright independence, which experienced electoral ups and downs in the last 
three decades of the twentieth century. This prompted in turn reforms to 
implement full linguistic and cultural parity at the federal level, as well as 
perennial negotiations to provide Quebec with yet greater autonomy within the 
Canadian framework (Burnaby & Ricento 1998). 
FRANCE: France provides an interesting example of issues arising from 
the persistence of regional languages, notably Breton, Alsatian, Occitan, Basque, 
and Corsican. Notwithstanding the country’s Jacobin centralist tradition, 
successive republics have also cultivated the image of a nation consisting of 
“small fatherlands” and embraced a domesticated version of regionalism in the 
form of folklore, often expressed in the regional languages (Thiesse 2000). The 
Loi Deixonne (1951) provided for the limited teaching of these languages as 
optional subjects in public secondary schools and the identitarian quests of the 
1970s fostered demands for the expansion of such programs. Endorsed by a 
new leadership within the Socialist Party formed by the movements of the 1960s, 
they were translated into policy when it gained power in the 1980s and again in 
the 1990s. As of 1997, about three percent of pre-university students in both 
public and private education were enrolled in regional language classes (Le 
Monde, July 21, 1999). However, in reaction to this, in 1992 a Gaullist 
government enacted a constitutional amendment declaring French the national 
language and invoked the amendment four years later as grounds for refusing to 
sign the European Charter of Minority Languages, on the grounds that this would 
undermine the hegemony of French (Wexler 1996). Language policy was made 
into an electoral issue the following year, when Socialist leader Lionel Jospin 
expressed support for linguistic and cultural pluralism and after his victory, 
France signed the Charter, albeit with some reservations. The Socialist   23
government also granted an unprecedented degree of autonomy to Corsica and  
announced a plan to offer bilingual education to the island’s population.  
 
PART TWO: THE CHALLENGE OF CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION 
 
The sharp contrast conventionally drawn between overseas “nations of 
immigrants” and Europe’s “endogenous nations” is founded on two 
misunderstandings that mirror each other:  on the one hand, current immigration 
is more of a new phenomenon for the United States, Canada, and Australia than 
Europeans assume; but on the other, most European countries have had more 
experience with immigration and cultural diversity than they usually acknowledge. 
In the United States, for example, because of the draconian restrictions 
imposed on immigration from Asia and Europe in the 1920s, as well as the 
effects of the Great Depression and of World War II, the proportion foreign-born 
in the total population declined steadily until it bottomed out in 1965 at a mere 
five percent, the lowest level since 1830 (Fix & Passell 1994). In relation to this, 
developments of the last three decades constitute a startling departure: the 
foreign-born population grew threefold from 9.6 million in 1970—the lowest level 
since 1900—to 28.4 million in 2000, and as a proportion of total population it 
more than doubled, from 4.7 percent in 1970 —the lowest since 1850— to 10.4 
percent in 2000 (U.S. Census Bureau March 2001).  Yet in 2000 the U.S. was 
much less of an “immigration country” than Canada (19 percent foreign-born of 
the total population), New Zealand (22.5) and Australia (25), and does not even 
appear in a list of the world’s 15 top immigrant-receiving countries.  The only 
European country that does is Switzerland, whose proportion equals Australia’s 
although not of concern here (International Organization for Migration 2003:306). 
The diversity of contemporary immigration is indicated by the fact that 
whereas in 1960 the top five source countries for legal immigrants in the U.S. 
were, in descending order,  Mexico, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
Italy, in 2000 Mexico remained at the top, but the next four were the Philippines, 
Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and Korea.
3  Among foreign-born residents in   24
2000, Mexico was in the lead (7.8 million), followed by China (1.4), the 
Philippines (1.2), India (1.0) and Cuba (1.0). The new immigrants are also more 
diverse than their predecessors with regard to socioeconomic characteristics: 
while newcomers as a whole are less educated than natives, a higher proportion 
than ever before are university-educated. On the other hand, in some respects, 
today’s immigrants are not as heterogenous as their predecessors; since 1970, 
some 40 percent have originated in countries whose official or dominant 
language is Spanish, and most of these are Roman Catholics. 
On the European side, around the turn of the twentieth century, the 
industrial leaders had substantial numbers of foreign residents, mostly temporary 
workers but also some refugees, some of whom turned into permanent settlers 
(Moch 1992; Simon 1995).  The most startling case is France, whose foreign-
born proportion reached 7 percent in 1930   --about the same level as today-- 
and where nearly one out of every four nationals has at least one immigrant 
grandparent from Italy, Belgium, Spain, or Poland (Noiriel 1988; Tribalat 1991; 
Hargreaves 1995). In the same vein, about ten percent of the white population of 
Great Britain is of immigrant descent, mostly Irish but also eastern or southern 
European; a substantial number of Germans trace their origns to French 
Huguenot refugees of the seventeenth century or Polish workers of the late 
nineteenth; and a considerable number of Swiss are the children or 
grandchildren of early twentieth-century “guest workers” who stayed on, mostly 
Italian.  European responses to the challenge of incorporation in the first half of 
the twentieth century ranged extremely broadly, from forceful assimilation and 
accommodation to rejection, “ethnic cleansing,” and industrial genocide.
4 A new 
immigration era dawned in the post-World War II period, with the influx of 
Commonwealth immigrants from the Indian subcontinent and the West Indies to 
Britain in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as of “guest workers” or their informal 
equivalent to continental countries in the 1960s and 1970s.  Concurrently, there 
was a steady broadening of source countries.  Starting from the less developed 
parts of Europe itself (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece), they expanded to include 
the adjoining periphery (notably Turkey and Yugoslavia), and regions of the Third   25
World historically connected with Europe by way of colonialism, including the 
West Indies --sometimes involving citizens, as with Puerto Ricans in the U.S.-- 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Maghreb, and sub-Saharan Africa.  The 
proportion of non-European immigrants grew steadily, and more of them were 
Muslims. With over over 8 million adherents, Islam now constitutes by far the 
largest immigrant religion in Europe, and the third largest overall  (Nielsen 
1995).
5 
Although Western European countries tightened their gates in the wake of 
the oil shock and ensuing economic downturn in the early 1970s, most of the 
foreign workers brought in originally as temporary sojourners stayed on, and 
subsequently brought in their immediate families. There was a new influx of 
asylum-seekers from the Third World in the 1980s; and in the 1990s, of victims of 
the war and “ethnic cleansing” in former Yugoslavia. Many of the asylees turned 
into family settlers as well. Though most receivers have tightened their admission 
policies, there is a continuing trickle of legal family reunion as well as a certain 
amount of illegal immigration.   Because it is generally younger and the females 
are more fertile, the immigrant population or of recent immigrant origin is growing 
at a considerably higher rate than the hosts. 
Although precise comparisons are difficult because of different methods of 
enumeration, it is clear that at the end of the twentieth century, the extent to 
which West European countries may be termed “immigration countries” varied 
considerably: from a high of 57.3 percent of the labor force in Luxembourg and 
25 percent foreign-born in Switzerland, to 2.5 percent foreign-born of the total 
population in Finland (and only 1.5 percent of its labor force). Leaving aside the 
outliers, most countries had an overall population of between 5 and 10 percent 
foreign born, and the proportion foreign in their labor force was slightly lower 
(e.g., Netherlands 3.4 percent, United Kingdom 3.7, Denmark 4.4, France 5.8, 
Belgium and Germany 8.8, Austria 10) (OECD 2002). Although inclusion of the 
naturalized population and of members of the second generation who are 
citizens would make for a somewhat larger population of “immigrant origin,” this 
category would be relatively smaller than its American equivalent, suggesting   26
that quantitatively speaking, Europe’s “incorporation load” is somewhat lighter 
than that of the United States, and certainly Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand. 
In short, although there is no denying that immigration played a very 
different role in the development of the United States and Europe, uncritical 
acceptance of the essentialized distinction between “endogenous nations” and 
“nations of immigration” fosters ignorance of Europe’s historical encounters with 
immigrant populations, for better and for worse, and clouds the largely parallel 
objective experiences of Europe and the United States in the second half of the 
twentieth century. It is all the more striking, therefore, that debates over 
incorporation on both sides of the Atlantic remain imprisoned within such 
divergent mythic constructions. 
Immigration leads inevitably to heated discussions about how boundaries 
between “us” and “them” might be drawn or erased.  On one side of the Atlantic, 
the passions awakened in 1989 by the Rushdie affair in the United Kingdom and 
the “headscarf” affair in France denote a simmering confrontation between 
“Christian” Europe and “intruding” Islam; in the United States, the issues raised 
by the English-Only movement point to an equally dramatic clash between 
“Anglo-America” and the “invading” Spanish language.  As major foci of tension 
and contention, Islam and Spanish are metonyms for the dangers that those 
most opposed to immigration perceive as looming ahead: loss of cultural identity, 
accompanied by disintegrative separatism or communal conflict. 
A consideration of the emergence of particular elements of culture as the 
focal points of contentious debates provides an entry point into the dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion more generally.  At the heart of all debates about 
incorporation are the twin questions: How different can we afford to be? How 
alike must we be? Negotiations about these matters in turn center around identity 
issues: Who can become a member of society, and what are the conditions for 
membership. Although collective identity-formation is commonly conceptualized 
as a self-referential process (Anderson 1983; Greenfeld 1992), it usually also 
involves self-conscious efforts by members of a group to distinguish themselves   27
from whom they are not, and hence is better understood as a dialectical process 
whose key feature is the delineation of boundaries between “us” and “not-us” 
(Barth 1969). The process of incorporation can be thought of as the negotiations 
in which hosts and immigrants engage around these boundaries. 
Underlying the familiar distinction between “assimilationist” and 
“multicultural” stances is a variable pertaining to different ways of negotiating 
boundaries (Bauboeck 1994).
6 
1. Boundary maintenance:  This entails the maintenance of the boundary 
itself as a prominent dimension of social organization, and the 
incorporation of the immigrant group in a subordinate position, which 
usually included the denial of citizenship or its equivalent (Zolberg 
1987).
7  Commonplace in colonial societies, this took the form of 
slavery in North America, and subsequently of “plural societies” in the 
West Indies, Southeast Asia, and East Africa, involving  distinct layers 
of natives, imported plantation workers (in the case of Asians, often 
referred to as “coolies”), and European settlers or overseers.  Although 
the commitment of contemporary democratic regimes in Europe and 
North America to human rights rules out such arrangements, most have 
recurrently attempted to maximize the economic benefits of imported 
labor while denying these workers the rights of citizenship. Much of 
post-World War II European immigration originated in this fashion, as 
did a considerable portion of Mexican immigration into the United 
States. Although in most cases, such arrangements proved unstable, 
and a large portion of the workers eventually gained access to 
permanent residence, i.e., became immigrants, including the possibility 
of obtaining citizenship, the residue of this “wanted but not welcome” 
pattern creates obstacles to their full incorporation, notably a legacy of 
stereotypes of these immigrants as cultural inferiors, unsuitable for full 
membership. 
2. Individual boundary crossing, without any change in the structure of the 
receiving society and leaving the distinction between insiders and    28
outsiders unaffected. This is the commonplace process whereby 
immigrants change themselves by acquiring some of the attributes of 
the host identity. Examples include replacing their mother tongue with 
the host language; naturalization; and religious conversion. Where this 
is the dominant pattern of incorporation, it is appropriate to speak of 
“assimilation” (i.e., rendering similar).  
3. Boundary blurring, based on a broader definition of integration -- one 
which affects the structure (ie. the legal, social and cultural boundaries) 
of the receiving society. Its core feature is the tolerance of multiple 
memberships and an overlapping of collective identities hitherto thought 
to be separate and mutually exclusive; it is the taming or domestication 
of what was once seen as “alien” differences. Examples include formal 
or informal public bilingualism, the possibility of dual nationality, the 
institutionalization of immigrant faiths (including public recognition, 
where relevant).  
4. Boundary shifting, which denotes a reconstruction of a group=s identity, 
whereby the line differentiating members from non-members is 
relocated, either in the direction of inclusion or exclusion. This is a more 
comprehensive process, which brings about a more fundamental 
redefinition of the situation. By and large, the rhetoric of pro-immigration 
activists and of immigrants themselves can be read as arguments on 
behalf of the expansion of boundaries to encompass newcomers whilst 
that of the anti-immigrant groups as an attempt to redefine them 
restrictively in order exclude them.
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Boundary-shifting can occur only after substantial boundary-crossing and 
boundary-blurring have taken place; however, it does not necessarily follow in 
their wake because of the possibility of negative reactions, as noted. 
Negotiations under way in the Netherlands today might eventually result in a shift 
of the boundary of recognized religious “pillars” to include Islam. Paralleling this, 
the contemporary spread of Spanish in some regions of the United States may   29
prepare the way for a more explicit reconfiguration of these regions into bilingual 
entities, at least in some aspects of daily life.  
Both boundary-crossing and boundary-shifting involve a “liminal” phase, 
fraught with awesome tension because it involves an “unnatural act,” the 
transformation of strangers into members, of the “not-us” into “part of us” (Turner 
1969).  Thus, an acceleration of boundary-crossing and of boundary-shifting can 
provoke negative reactions on the part of the hosts, leading to a crystallization of 
boundaries, the imposition of conditions that render crossing more difficult and 
blurring impossible, and perhaps even a redefinition of the host identity 
amounting to a shift of the boundary in a more exclusive direction. Past examples 
include the changing status of the Japanese in the United States in the early 
decades of the century --from the “blurred” boundary established by way of the 
Gentleman’s Agreement of 1907, whereby the Japanese were not formally 
excluded on condition that Japan restrain their emigration, to their formal 
exclusion alongside all other Asians in 1924. Notorious European instances 
include the de-nationalization of  Jews by the Nazi régime and the invalidation of 
certain naturalizations by Vichy France.  More recently, the acceleration of 
boundary-crossing and boundary-shifting has given rise to reactionary 
movements and parties, some of which have scored significant political victories 
and thereby contributed to slowing down movement toward more proactive 
incorporation policies (Schain, et al. 2002). Concomitantly, some of the 
newcomers may react to increased boundary-crossing opportunities by resisting 
the “temptation” of identity change, manifested in the adoption of “traditional” 
dress or adherence to more conservative or even “fundamentalist” versions of 
their religion.  This is by no means limited to immigrants from the Middle East or 
Asia, as denoted by the persistence of super-orthodox Jewish communities on 
both sides of the Atlantic. 
Though incorporation is an interactive process, involving both hosts and 
newcomers, the actors are not equal: since the negotiations take place in the 
host country, power relationships are generally asymmetric in favor of the host 
majority, which naturally has the upper hand.  In the cultural realm, host values   30
and traditions are firmly implanted and benefit from  institutional support, while 
the immigrant minorities, who may differ initially with regard to a variety of cultural 
elements deemed significant by the hosts, notably religion and language, are at 
best in a liminal situation with regard to formal and informal membership in the 
host society, as well as institutional recognition.  
While in the main, boundary crossings are the actions of immigrant 
newcomers, the emergence of “fusion” in music, food, art, dress, and even 
speech and manners, point to boundary crossings on the part of individuals from 
the host majority, This may contribute to the incorporation of immigrants in 
general by creating buffer zones of indifference to elements of imported culture 
formerly thought unacceptable, and some of these elements may even come to 
be positively valued and celebrated. In the same vein, though boundary shifts 
and blurrings of host structures have the most wide-ranging effects on immigrant 
incorporation, as pro-active and creative actors, immigrants do not only passively 
react to host decisions about structures of most relevance to them; their views of 
how boundaries should be drawn, crossed, shifted or blurred are part of the 
negotiations about boundaries. Though their voice might be muted as a function 
of their marginal position, the reinforcement of the rights of persons in liberal 
democracies, both as the result of internal political struggles and the spread of 
universal human rights, bolsters the legitimacy of the aspirations of immigrant 
newcomers; consequently, their views on issues involving their welfare carry 
greater weight in negotiations. 
Boundary dynamics vary also as a function of the nature of different 
components of culture (Bader 1996). Hence the cultural dimension can itself be 
disaggregated into discrete elements, each of which can be considered in terms 
of the “polar situations” it allows.  This can then be used for mapping 
negotiations.  With regard to language and religion, different issues are likely to 
arise, hence the conflicts are likely to take different forms, and different sorts of  
“settlements” will be achieved.  
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Religion:  
Although the contemporary incorporation of human rights into national 
legislations vastly facilitates boundary blurring, issues like the content of public 
education or the development of religiously based schools --which in many 
countries benefit from public subsidies-- involve complex negotiations, with many 
opportunities for difficulties and confrontations. The baseline is that contemporary 
liberal  regimes are bound by their own constitutive rules of religious freedom not 
to require conformity to the majority religion as a condition for formal membership 
(i.e., citizenship).  As interpreted today, religious freedom usually means also that 
no particular affiliation can be required for employment, and in most cases that 
the state must intervene actively to protect persons against discrimination on 
religious grounds.  Beyond this, in practice religious freedom encompasses 
“freedom to” in addition to “freedom to” –a distinction drawn from Isaiah Berlin— 
involving the possibility of meeting religious obligations, if any, in ordinary life.  
Since much of ordinary life today involves state-regulated elements, such as 
mandatory school attendance and specified working hours, this may require the 
state to intervene, willy-nilly, to insure appropriate arrangements.   
In this manner, the constitutional obligations of liberal regimes to respect 
religious freedom move contemporary possibilities away from assimilation toward 
the pluralist pole. However, the pluralist extreme, in the form of separate 
communities with concomitant legal systems, such as was found in the Ottoman 
Empire (and is still visible in its successor states), is ruled out because it is 
incompatible with the structural character of modern nation-states.  
Consequently, under contemporary conditions, negotiations within the religious 
sphere lead to a range of possible settlements that might be termed attenuated 
pluralism. This includes: equitable funding policies or tax exemptions, access to 
established forms of legal recognition, regular consultation of public authorities 
with representatives of religious communities, sensitivity in the field of marriage 
and family law including recognition of religious marriage ceremonies or 
delegation of the civil authority to a religious community in specified 
circumstances, the provision of appropriate burial facilities, chaplaincy facilities in   32
public institutions such as the military, prisons and hospitals, multi-faith 
knowledge-oriented religious education in schools, as well as the possibility of 
taking holidays in conjunction with religious festivals. 
Negotiations over incorporation are rendered much more difficult when the 
religious boundary, as constructed by the hosts, is compounded by ethnic or 
“racial” differences.  In the United States, for example, the issue of Roman 
Catholicism was propelled to the fore by the massive arrival of Irish immigrants in 
the 1830s. For thoughtful Americans who believed that their democratic 
republican culture was grounded in Protestant congregationalism --a view which 
Alexis de Tocqueville erected into a leading political theory-- Roman Catholicism 
was dangerous because it was an inherently authoritarian religion, as confirmed 
by the papacy’s contemporaneous condemnation of liberalism and democracy. 
However, their responses to immigration were shaped also by the image of the 
Irish as the ethnic “other” in the formation of the English national identity. 
Accordingly, the process of incorporation involved protracted negotiations over 
both religious and ethnic boundaries: eventually, the Irish became “white” 
(Ignatiev 1995), and Roman Catholicism came to be recognized as one of three 
American religions; this pattern of accommodation was eventually extended to 
Jews as well <<Sacks 1994).  In Europe, a similar crisis was precipitated by the 
arrival of Jews from eastern Europe in the latter part of the 19th century. 
Although the religious boundary had begun to blur, as indicated by the fact that 
nationals of the Jewish faith gained full rights as citizens or subjects in many 
countries, immigration prompted the elaboration of a “new antisemitism,” which 
emphasized the negative traits of Jews as a “race” rather than as Christ-killers 
(Pulzer 1964; Herberg 1960 [1955]). This construction culminated in the Nazi 
Nuremberg laws, which discarded religious affiliation altogether on behalf of 
ancestry, simultaneously sharpening the boundary and relocating it toward the 
exclusionary pole.  
In this manner, the constitutional obligations of liberal regimes to respect 
religious freedom move contemporary possibilities away from assimilation toward 
the pluralist pole. However, the pluralist extreme, in the form of separate   33
communities with concomitant legal systems, such as was found in the Ottoman 
Empire (and is still visible in its successor states), is ruled out because it is 
incompatible with the structural character of modern nation-states.  
Consequently, under contemporary conditions, negotiations within the religious 
sphere lead to a range of possible settlements that might be termed attenuated 
pluralism. This includes: equitable funding policies or tax exemptions, access to 
established forms of legal recognition, regular consultation of public authorities 
with representatives of religious communities, sensitivity in the field of marriage 
and family law including recognition of religious marriage ceremonies or 
delegation of the civil authority to a religious community in specified 
circumstances, the provision of appropriate burial facilities, chaplaincy facilities in 
public institutions such as the military, prisons and hospitals, multi-faith 
knowledge-oriented religious education in schools, as well as the possibility of 
taking holidays in conjunction with religious festivals. 
Although incorporation into the host society always involves some 
combination of boundary-crossing, boundary-shifting or boundary-blurring, these 
processes unfold differently for various cultural elements.  To begin with, 
language and religion manifest themselves in very different ways materially and 
organizationally in the public and private spheres.  Secondly, whereas liberal 
regimes in contemporary times are required by their own constitutions and by 
international conventions to respect some cultural differences, and even to 
provide protection from discrimination on these accounts, this does not apply 
equally to all aspects of culture, and enjoyment of “rights” entails different 
arrangements in different spheres. 
Islam:  Despite Islam’s long-time presence in the West, it arose on the 
political agenda only in the 1980s.  In Europe, large-scale immigration from 
Islamic countries began in the 1950s, with the arrival of Pakistanis in Britain and 
of Maghrebis in France and Belgium, and expanded further in the 1960s with the 
coming of Turks to Germany and the Netherlands. On the continent, the cultural 
identity of these newcomers initially arose little interest because they were 
viewed essentially as temporary workers, whose incorporation was limited to a   34
subordinate role in the economic sphere (Castles & Kossack 1985). Living in an 
overwhelmingly male and segregated environment, with little or no opportunity for 
engaging in a normal life, they lent support to the convenient assumption that 
they were as secular as the rest of the West. Their religious practice, if any, was 
seen as a private matter, which presumably could be accommodated within the 
framework of established arrangements, notably time off from work on the week 
end (Nielsen 1992).  Perceptions of Islam were shaped also by a conflation of 
religion and ethnicity, inseparable from the unfortunate reality of deeply 
embedded prejudice on the part of “whites” toward “browns” and “blacks,” most 
of whom were colonials or former colonial subjects. Islam became much more 
visible in the mid-1970s after Europe closed its doors to low-skilled labor 
migration but left open the possibility of family reunion.  Transformed from single 
male migrants to families aspiring to permanent settlement, Muslim immigrant 
populations rapidly expanded (Dassetto & Nonneman 1996).   
Concurrently, the hosts’ perceptions of Islam were also shaped by the 
changing international situation.  In short, OPEC’s success in occasioning an oil 
crisis, the Iranian revolution and the American hostage crisis, the rise of Khadafi,  
Palestinian guerilla actions, the growth of Islamic fundamentalist movements, the 
Rushdie Affair, the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraqi attack on Kuwait that triggered the Gulf 
War transformed the image of Islam in the West from a “passive” into an 
“aggressive” civilization, while lending support to established “orientalist” beliefs, 
especially the idea that Islam is inherently incompatible with liberal democracy, 
and that individual Muslims function as docile instruments of ruthless secular 
leaders and equally ruthless “ayatollahs” (Huntington 1993). This was further 
confirmed by radical pronouncements such as that of Britain’s marginal but much 
publicized “Muslim Parliament,” which called for Muslims to abstain from 
participating in political life altogether because “Britain is not an Islamic state” --a 
stance which strikingly echoes the pronouncements of the Vatican in the mid-
nineteenth century, causing Catholic immigrants to be regarded as a threat by 
Americans.  Although Islam is not constituted as a centralized, authoritarian, 
international Church, it does share the universalist aspirations of the Roman   35
Catholic Church and diplomatic representatives of predominantly Islamic 
countries have influenced the funding and organization of mosques and their 
congregations abroad, so as to lend credence to the notion that adherence to 
Islam raises an obstacle to the integration of immigrants (Sunier & Meyer 1997). 
With the emergence of Muslim families, the process of incorporation was 
broadened beyond the economic sphere to encompass cultural matters as well.  
As factory workers who appeared religiously indifferent --and in many cases 
were-- left the confines of all-male communities to take on new responsibilities as 
heads of families, they acquired a “pater-familial devotionalism,” acquiring new 
concerns regarding spiritual welfare, the maintenance of proper gender relations, 
and the education of their children (Dassetto & Nonneman 1996).  Accordingly, 
the imperatives of Islamic prescriptions and practices  arose not only in the 
home, but also into the public sector, raising issues which, as magnified by the 
media, appeared difficult, if not impossible, to resolve. Sectors like education, 
health and social services, areas which lie at the very center of family and 
identity, provide many examples of how torturous such negotiations might be. 
Many of the points of controversy revolve in particular around negotiations about 
how parents might pass on their Islamic heritage to their children.  For example, 
tug-of-wars around issues like physical education, sex education and religious 
education in schools have been common in many places. Others areas of 
religious stress confronted by Muslims on a daily basis include improperly 
slaughtered meat, the difficulties they face in securing places of worship --
particularly in erecting  mosques, the lack of provisions for circumcision, and 
indifference of employers and of the state in making space for Islam in the 
workplace (e.g. provision of rooms for daily prayers, modification of shifts to take 
account of fasting during Ramadan) (Césari 1997). 
Having had little experience in public schools supportive of their religious 
traditions, and encountering much that is hostile to them, it is not surprising that  
Muslim immigrants voiced a growing demand for Islamic schools of their own. As 
the Muslim population grows older, other issues such as inheritance and mixed   36
marriages are likely to emerge as well, ensuring that issues surrounding Islam 
will not go away quickly or quietly. 
The question facing Muslim immigrants and their children is not only how 
they can overcome such practical problems, but also how they can develop a 
sense of belonging and being comfortable about being not only “Muslims in 
Europe,” but “European Muslims.” According to some observers, this would 
require them to relinquish their “siege mentality” and “their sense of moral 
superiority and righteousness and seek[ing] new ways of empowering 
themselves” (Sardar 1995). However, this is a two-way process; much depends 
also on how the host majority responds. 
Potential arrangements regarding Muslim demands are guided by 
established institutional arrangements in host countries. However, faced with 
pressures to accommodate religious demands brought up by Muslims, the 
European hosts --particularly in countries that have established Roman Catholic 
or Protestant churches-- have tended to hold back and grant them less than has 
been obtained by other religious minorities and sects under existing institutional 
arrangements (Carens & Williams 1996). On the other hand, in those same 
countries there is a tendency --reflecting bureaucratic preferences and 
expectations-- to treat Islam as if it were, or could become, organized along the 
lines of a centralized Christian church, with a hierarchical ministerial bureaucracy 
endowed with authority over the faithful. This has led to intra-Muslim conflicts 
over the privilege of representing the community vis-à-vis the host authorities. 
Living in the context of a secularized Christian Europe, many Muslims 
experience European claims of religious freedom as a contradiction, since they 
receive little public facilitation and in fact face many practical difficulties in trying 
to live according to Islam (Pedersen 1996). From the immigrants’ perspective, 
the hosts’ positions appear quite remote from the “pluralist” pole that prevails in 
the religious sphere with regard to the varieties of Christianity and, to a lesser 
extent, Judaism. In addition to the often-voiced charge that local and national 
authorities fail to respect the principles of human rights as they pertain to their 
case, Muslims widely believe that legislation and administrative regulations and   37
practices are not being extended equitably to their own religious community, and 
that there is extensive ignorance and insensitivity regarding minority religious 
matters more generally. Muslims commonly suspect that there is a hidden policy 
to discriminate against Islam. Existing legislation against discrimination does not 
seem to protect them from the manipulation of planning and zoning laws to 
prevent the building of places of worship, nor from the exploitation of 
administrative procedures to deny public funding to their religious organizations, 
nor from the fact that immigration laws seem to be applied in such a way as to 
prevent cross-border families from celebrating rites of passage and major 
religious festivals together. Even at the symbolic level, “recognition” in some 
institutionalized fashion is elusive. 
A particularly interesting and somewhat paradoxical case in point is the 
demand which was put forth by Muslims in the United Kingdom, in the wake of 
the Rushdie affair, to extend the existing anti-blasphemy law under which the 
state can prosecute those who insult the Anglican deity, to those who insult Allah. 
Were they to succeed, this would be a clear case of shifting the established 
boundary in the religious realm to encompass Islam.  Similarly, satisfaction of 
demands to sanction “incitement to religious hatred” along the lines of existing 
legislation regarding “racial hatred”would involve the state positively in boundary 
shifting (Poulter 1990).   
Conversely, the reluctance of European states to shift the boundary 
defining religions that deserve special respect or protection to encompass Islam 
suggests, as we argued in the introduction, that despite Europe=s sociological 
secularization --indicated by low rates of religious practice-- all European 
countries retain Christianity as a major component of their identity.  Or more 
accurately, in the wake of the Jewish Holocaust, a consensus emerged among 
liberal democracies on the unacceptability of institutionalized antisemitism, and 
the boundary was blurred by way of a redefinition of Christian civilization into 
Judeo-Christian civilization to incorporate Jews as fellow westerners. Boundary-
crossing thereby became easier as well, and the vast majority of the 
descendants of Jewish immigrants became thoroughly socialized into their   38
respective national cultures. Jewish religious institutions evolved accordingly, 
and gained recognition within the appropriate framework of church-state 
relations. A telling indicator of this process are the assurances given by Prime 
Minister Edouard Balladur to leaders of the French Jewish community in 1994, 
following the Islamic “headscarf” affair, that the government’s decree prohibiting 
the wearing of “ostentatious” religious symbols in the schools did not apply to the 
cap worn by Jewish boys (Kapil 1997).  Whether or not a these negotiations have 
resulted in a fully inclusive boundary shift is still the subject of considerable 
debate among European Jews.  What is quite clear, however, is that the religious 
boundary remains quite fixed in relation to Islam, and in some cases became 
more clearly defined in the course of confrontations. 
On the basis of a comparative study of Britain, France, and Germany in 
the period 1973-2001, Koenig found that the public incorporation of Muslim 
immigrants follows specific patterns which depend on the legally institutionalized 
logic of religious politics that emerged from historically specific trajectories of 
state-formation and nation-building, thus confirming the conclusion of Jan Rath 
and his team, that the institutionalization of Islam is “to a far greater degree 
determined by the societies in which Muslims settle than by the Muslims 
themselves.” (Rath 2001). In the same vein, Christopher Soper and Joel Fetzer 
have established that the pattern of church-state relations –i.e., separation, 
concordatarian, and establishment— is the major factor explaining differences in 
the accommodation of Muslim religious practices in France, Germany, and 
Britain (Soper & Fetzer 2003).  A first crucial factor is “the degree of the 
institutionalization of the idea of the ‘individual’ in each polity, as it affects the 
very definition of ‘religion’.” In corporatist polities, where rights are ascribed to 
corporate bodies, religion is regarded as a formal membership organization, 
which can directly be integrated into the state’s rationalising project. In statist and 
liberal polities, where the individual is the primary bearer of rights, ‘religion’ is 
perceived as an individual orientation organised in voluntaristic associations. As 
Koenig points out, “It is not by accident that conflicts about Muslim claims for 
recognition in Germany crystallise around legal questions of organisation, as   39
evinced by the notorious debate about the recognition of Islamic organisations as 
corporations of public law. . . , a problem which in Britain is of rather secondary 
relevance.” (6). A second factor is the degree of “stateness”: “In nation-states 
oriented toward statist or corporatist polity models, such as France and 
Germany, the incorporation of Muslim minorities is co-ordinated by the 
organizational center of the state, while in liberal polities, such as Great Britain, it 
rather takes the form of civil negotiations, mostly at the local level.” Most notably, 
the French government’s attempt to create a central representative organization 
of Muslims, discussed below, “would be inconceivable in Britain” (7).  The third 
factor is the relationship of symbols of national identity to European meta-
narratives of “secularization”: “In so far as universalistic symbols of national 
identity are connected to ideologies of secularism, as in the case of French 
laïcité, explicitly religious claims for recognition are conceived as transgressing 
the symbolic boundary between the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ and, hence, as 
polluting the symbolic centre of the nation” (7). As against this, polities where 
nation-building was sustained by collective religious or confessional mobilization, 
as was the case in Britain and Germany,  are in principle open to religious 
symbols. 
There is considerable variation in the extent to which Muslim newcomers 
and their European hosts have succeeded in negotiating routine procedures for 
dealing with the demands of Muslim daily life. Overall, some progress along 
these lines has been achieved in the United Kingdom --where matters like 
planning permission for mosques, permission to perform religious slaughter, sites 
for Muslim burial and the like were routinely settled by the early 1990s (Vertovec 
1996). Although there were no state-funded Islamic schools, some 15-30  
independent schools were established and maintained with private funds (Sardar 
1995; Dwyer & Meyer 1996). There was a breakthrough in early 1998, when the 
Labour Government approved two schools for state funding (New York Times, 
Jan. 10, 1998: A6).  In the Netherlands and Belgium, the organization of society 
and polity into ideological/confessional “pillars” is potentially accommodating to 
Muslim demands; however, Islam has not quite achieved a status equal to that of   40
the other pillars. Although the number of state-funded Islamic schools in the 
Netherlands is the highest in Europe ( 29 in 1996) some upper limit seems to 
have been reached. In July 1997, the Council of State upheld the decision of the 
Ministry of Education to prohibit the setting up of a seventh islamic primary 
school in Amsterdam (Dassetto & Nonneman 1996; Dwyer & Meyer 1996; 
Gowricharn & Mungra 1996). (Migration News Sheet, August 1997: 20).  
Nevertheless, the Netherlands appears to have achieved a well-honed 
negotiation mode, undoubtedly facilitated by the long tradition of “pillarization” 
which provides effective parity to major faiths and provides for the minor ones to 
be in effect “hosted” by the major ones (Kraal 2003). 
 
FRANCE:  Islam emerged as a major religion in France with the settlement of 
immigrants from Algeria, who included both “guest workers” who began to be 
recruited in the 1950s as well as personnel of the colonial militia (harkis) who 
were evacuated at independence; France received additional Muslim immigrants 
from its former protectorates in Morocco and Tunisia, as well as from sub-
Saharan Africa, notably Senegal and Mali. So long as the Muslim population 
consisted mostly of male adult workers, living largely in dormitory-type housing 
on the outskirts of cities, religious practice usually took place within the housing 
complex or at work, for example in the famed Renault factory on the edge of 
Paris. However, in the 1970s, while cutting back on immigration, France allowed 
for family reunion; and as immigrant families tended to have more children than 
their French counterparts, the “population of immigrant origin,” as it is termed in 
France, grew steadily as a proportion of the total, with the increase most 
noticeable among among youths (Césari 1997; Gaspard & Khosrokhavar 1995; 
House 1996; Kapil 1997). 
By the 1980s, France had by far the largest Muslim population of any 
country in Western Europe, and there were indications of their increasing 
religious practice, possible a reflection of a shift to family life styles. According to 
a 2001 survey, 70 percent of French Muslims fasted during Ramadan, as against 
only 60 percent in 1989 and 1994; as expected, the frequency of religious   41
practice was higher among older persons (84 percent for those over 55), but 
more surprisingly, it was also higher among the 16-24 age group (74 percent), 
confirming other observations suggesting that Islam was becoming an “identity 
marker” among adolescents (Le Monde, 5 Oct. and 17 Nov. 2001).  In the same 
vein, a study carried out in 2000-01 found that students of North African origin 
defined themselves principally as Muslims, rather than on the basis of their 
ancestral country or current place of residence. While not contesting the secular 
nature of school, 63 percent favored displaying religious symbols in school, as 
against only 28.5 percent of non-Muslims (Le Monde, May 13, 2002). 
In addition to the general problems of residential segregation and 
discrimination, which French Muslims face along with other immigrants 
throughout Europe, practicing families experience what might be termed “routine 
operational difficulties” such as securing properly inspected and safe halal meat; 
obtaining halal food in institutional eating facilities such as schools, hospitals, or 
working places;  a shortage of Muslim burial facilities; negative reactions to 
requests for absences from school or work on the occasion of Muslim holidays, 
etc. The most persistent problem concerns the shortage of suitable places of 
worship.  The first guide to French Mosques, published in 2003, listed 1,554 
places of worship, of which the vast majority were located in disaffected 
warehouses or factories, or in improvised spaces within residential buildings, 
most judged too small for their congregations. Nationwide, there were only about 
ten mosques built for that purpose, including the “Great Mosques” of Paris, Lyon, 
Mantes-la-Jolie, and Evry-Curconnes  (Le Monde, January 25, 2002; April 21, 
2003). 
Within the educational sphere, matters came to a head in October 1989, 
when three young women were expelled from their secondary school because 
they wore a head scarf in class. Justified by the school’s principal on the grounds 
that it violated the separation of church and state, the expulsion triggered a 
vociferous public debate, in which it was pointed among other things that there 
were no such reactions to the wearing of crosses, a commonplace practice of 
French girls, or of the wearing of caps by some Jewish  boys.  The Socialist   42
government’s Minister of Education requested the Council of State to issue a 
ruling, and on November 27, 1989, the Council stated that “The wearing of 
religious tokens is not in itself incompatible with secularism [laïcité], on condition 
that they not have an “ostentatious or militant” character.” How that was to be 
established was not specified, however, leaving it in effect to local interpretation.  
In keeping with this opinion, the following month the Ministry of Education 
issued a circular to the effect that religious beliefs are a matter of individual 
conscience and are free, but that the respect of pluralism and the neutrality of 
public service requires that the educational community be protected from 
ideological or religious pressures. In no case could a student refuse to study 
certain parts of the school program nor to avoid classes on religious grounds; 
however, “certain authorization for absences can be granted exceptionally and 
for certain particular days to the extent that they correspond to well established 
religious holidays within an established calendar and without occasioning 
disturbances in school operations.” Matters subsequently cooled down; the 
expelled girls were reinstated, and local administrative courts tended to void 
subsequent expulsions occasioned by the wearing of scarves as well.  In 1994, 
the Minister of Education appointed a “mediator” to deal with such cases, but the 
number of cases brought to her attention remained quite low, seldom exceeding 
150, and none to date (November 2003) gave rise to an appeal to the Council of 
State. 
In the intervening period, increasingly concerned over the influence 
foreign governments, notably Algeria and Saudi  Arabia, exercised over Muslim 
residents and citizens by funding the operations of local mosques, successive 
French governments contemplated the elaboration of “French” Muslim 
institutions.  Despite France’s highly touted “separation of church and state” 
regime, religious institutions have an official public standing which would be 
totally unacceptable under the U.S. version of separation.  This is derived from 
the model established by Napoleon in his negotiations to reinstate the Roman 
Catholic church in the wake of the French Revolution. Subsequently, the two 
major Protestant faiths as well as Judaism were organized in keeping with the   43
Concordat’s “centralized national church” model, despite their traditionally 
congregational structure.  There arrangements were maintained after separation 
of church and state was enacted (1905), whereby places of worship became 
public buildings, in exchange for which the state assured their maintenance.  
Religious organizations could also obtain public support by constituting 
themselves into public interest organizations (under the law of 1901). From the 
perspective of the Muslim community, “recognition” of an official body of French 
Islam would help resolve a number of the operational problems noted, as it could 
negotiate, among other things, for the provision of land by way of inexpensive 
leases from municipalities as well as subsidies toward the construction of new 
mosques, and the resolution of other issues such as the provision of Muslim 
chaplains in hospitals and prisons (Sunier & Meyer 1997). 
While the separation regime remained most vigilantly enforced in the 
educational sphere, largely because of the militant commitment of the teachers’ 
unions to this principle, pressure from Catholic voters in the 1980s resulted in a 
major change of policy, whereby private schools with a religious identity can 
obtain support from the state to the extent that they administer the official 
curriculum, open themselves to inspection, and do not limit enrollment to 
members of their faith.  This provides the signal advantage of enabling them to 
charge only modest tuitions.  The first Muslim high school under this type of 
arrangement, launched by Dhaou Meskine, the Tunisian imam of the mosque of 
Clichy-sous-Bois in the Paris region, opened in 2001 in Aubervilliers (L’École de 
la réussite, “The School of Success”). Two others are currently in the planning 
stage. 
With regard to the nationalization of Islam, governmental initiatives finally 
got off the ground in 1997 following the appointment of Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement as Socialist Minister of Interior, who organized an advisory 
commission to that effect (Caldwell 2000).  At this time, French Islam was divided 
into three major wings: 
(1) The Great Mosque of Paris, generally considered close to the French 
government.  Its main strength is a network of some 100 scattered imams paid   44
by Algeria.  However, many do not speak French and hence have difficulty 
maintaing contact with younger generations; moreover, the Paris Mosque has not 
engaged in the elaboration of local associations, hence has little hold over the 
suburban populations. 
(2) The Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF), affiliated 
with the Union des organizations islamiques europénnes. Launched in 1983 by 
two Tunisians to challenge the hegemony of the Paris mosque, it was propelled 
to national attention on the occasion of the “scarf affair” of 1989.  Its more recent 
leadership is mostly Moroccan. Deriving its doctrine from the Egyptian-based 
Muslim Brotherhood, although its leaders insist they are not “dependent” on the 
Egyptian organization, the UOIF is considered “mysterious” and hence 
“dangerous” by the government.  It cannot be easily located on the 
“fundamentalism” scale, as it combines religious rigor with modernism, insisting 
on the necessity for Muslims to adapt themselves to their social and cultural 
environment. This is demonstrated among other things by the imams’ use of 
French in weekly sermons. By the late 1990s it had emerged as the most 
powerful Muslim federation thanks to its dense network of some 200 local 
associations, organized into eight administrative federations, as well as 
specialized organizations catering to youths and students.  Its annual congress 
held at the site of the former Paris airport, Le Bourget, is a major event  drawing 
large attendance from all over France (Le Monde Dec. 12, 2002).   
(3) The Fédération nationale des musulmans de France, supported by 
Morocco, with considerable strength in a variety of provincial cities. 
Chevènement’s strategy was essentially to contain the UOIF by promoting 
an alliance between the “Algerians” (Paris Mosque) and the “Moroccans” 
(FNMF). On January 28, 2000, an initial group of Muslim representatives signed 
a preliminary cooperation agreement toward the creation of a national body, and 
a number of others joined in on April 20.  However, negotiations then proceeded 
haltingly for the next two years, as the UOIF, making the most of its strength at 
the grass roots level, succeeded in preventing the making of any alliance at its 
expense.   45
Although governmental concern over foreign influences grew in the wake 
of 9/11, a survey of sermons preached in a variety of mosques between 
September 1999 and June 2001, conducted on behalf of the Ministry of Interior, 
was reassuring.  Most of the imams --a majority of them Moroccan—stayed away 
from politics;  while the older preachers focused mainly on instilling fear of hell, 
attributing the world’s woes to human sinfulness, while younger ones focused 
mainly on the obligations of citizenship, and emphasized the legitimacy of 
republican and secular norms as those imposed by France’s ruling majority (Le 
Monde, February 22, 2002). 
Finally an agreement was reached in late 2001 on electoral procedures for 
the constitution of the Conseil français du culte musulman [French Council of the 
Muslim Faith].  Each place of worship was allocated a number of delegates 
proportional to the area of its prayer room, up to 15 for the largest, and 18 for the 
Great Mosque of Paris; these would constitute an electorate college, which will in 
turn choose representatives to a constitutive assembly on the basis of 
proportional representation and list voting.  The resulting assembly will designate 
an executive board. There were also to be regional organizations, Conseils 
régionaux du culte musulman (CRCM) elected by “grand electors” designated by 
the mosques, again in proportion to the area of their prayer rooms; constituted 
into “1901 law associations”, i.e., privileged public interest corporations, these 
would play a decisive role in vital matters such as the provision of religious 
meeting places.  Initially scheduled for early 2002, the elections were repeatedly 
postponed as the various tendencies maneuvered for advantage (Le Monde April 
21, October 13, November 29, 2001; Feb. 21, April 25, May 3, 2002). 
Intervening vigorously in what observers characterized as a “Napoleonic” 
style, in late 2002 Minister of Interior Nicolas Sarkozy abandoned his 
precedessors’ strategy and initiated a collaboration with the UOIF in order to 
bring it into the fold, shortly exacting an agreement among the three major 
tendencies, said to represent some 70 percent of France’s Muslim 
congregations, on the allocation of leadership positions within the CFCM for its 
inaugural two-year period.  In effect, the outcome was decided ahead of time as   46
a condition for the elections to finally take place, with the Great Mosque of Paris 
obtaining the presidency and each of the other two major federations one of the 
two Vice-Presidencies. However, in the emerging co-management system 
engineered by the French government, relations were by no means equal, as the 
UOIF was clearly dominant by reason of its strength in the “Muslim suburbs,” and 
hence would emerge as the main intermediary between the Muslim population 
and the government.  Revealing the growing ethnic disparity within French Islam, 
others to be represented included the Turkish community (Comité de 
coordination des musulmans turcs de France),  allotted the office of Secretary 
General, as well as the West Africans, West Indians, and Indian Ocean islanders 
(Fédération française des associations islamiques d’Afrique, des Comores, et 
des Antilles, FFAICACA), granted the Secretariat for International Relations.  In 
addition, the head of the Lyon Mosque was made treasurer. The CFCM’s 
governing board was subsequently further broadened to make room for the Mufti 
of Marseille as well as for a lone woman.  Beyond this, there was agreement on a 
general assembly, to consist of some 200 members of whom 154 will be elected 
by the regions and 39 allocated to various organizations, including women’s 
groups.  An administrative council will include 42 regional representatives, 12 of 
federations, as well as 5 for the great mosques (Le Monde, Dec. 10 and Dec. 21, 
2002; Jan. 15, 2003). 
Following some further negotiations, the elections were finally scheduled 
for April 6 and 13, before the UOIF’s annual meeting in the Paris region, so as to 
minimize its influence.  In preparation, Minister Sarkozy as well as the leaders of 
the various tendencies assiduously campaigned, and President Chirac made a 
state visit to Algeria, pledging that France will establish “privileged relations” with 
its former colony (Le Monde, March 13 and April 4,2003; New York Times, April 
16, 2003). About 995 places of worship –some 75 percent of the estimated total  
-- participated in the selection of 4,032 “grand electors” empowered to choose 
the several executive bodies. Since the outcome of the national-level election 
had been pre-arranged, the electoral stakes pertained mainly to the regional 
assemblies. Against the government’s hopes, but in keeping with expectations   47
based on analyses of the federations’ respective strengths and weaknesses, the 
UOIF emerged as the decisive winner thanks to its organizational power and by 
successfully negotiating coalitions to oppose those constituted by its antagonists 
to contain them.  They performed even more spectacularly in the regional council 
elections held on June 15, prompting the President of the CFCM, Dr. Boubakeur, 
to tend his resignation –but only as a tactical move to exact some concessions 
from his opponents. Overall, the regional council elections decisively upset 
established relations between local government power holders and Muslim 
leaders in several of France’s major cities, notably Marseille. 
How effective the CFCM will be in mediating between France’s Muslims 
and the government is by no means clear because in the aftermath of the 
elections a number of groups contested its representativeness.  The UOIF itself 
was challenged from within its own religious camp by the Association des 
étudiants musulmans de France (AEIF).  Although Minister Sarkozy expressed 
satisfaction with the outcome, the government appeared to engaged in 
maneuvering designed to undermine the CFCM’s authority, as Amo Ferhati, 
adviser to Tokya Saïfi, Secretary of State for Development, organized the 
constitutive congress of the Conseil français des musulmans laïques – the 
French Council of Secular Muslims -- claiming to represent the “silent majority” of 
French Muslims and support from some 500 associations.  It should be noted 
that the organization’s apparently oxymoronic name further confirms to what 
extent “Muslim” has turned from a religious designation into a a quasi-ethnic 
identitarian one. 
While the formation of a Muslim body paralleling the organization of other 
religious in France does constitute a form of “recognition” and hence constitutes 
somewhat of a boundary shift that will probably contribute to the further 
incorporation of Muslims into French society, this development has by no means 
resolved other pending issues.  After a quiescent period, the “scarf” rose to the 
fore again in late 2002.  In early December, during Ramadan, a girl attending 
secondary school in Lyon’s prominent immigrant neighborhood was kicked out of 
one of her classes for wearing a small scarf formed into a headband, covering   48
neither her forehead nor ears.  Although some other teachers accepted her, the 
principal convoked her parents and demanded that she stop wearing the 
headband; they refused, insisting that they had already made a concession to 
French norms by reducing the scarf to a headband.  Called in, the national 
mediator counseled negotiations, but refrained from providing a solution.. After 
the student returned to class, still wearing her headband, some of the teachers 
demanded the convening of a disciplinary board, scheduled to take place the day 
before the February winter vacation, and threatened to go on strike if the student 
was allowed to go on.  Around the same time, a woman lawyer wearing a scarf 
was prohibited form appearing in court.  Later that spring, Interior Minister 
Sarkozy, who made a point of attending the annual congress of his UOIF allies, 
was booed when he insisted “religious signs” were not appropriate in public 
places.   
As the issue rose to the fore, a number of members of the National 
Assembly, from both right and left –including past Socialist Culture Minister Jack 
Lang—pressed for the enactment of a law explicitly prohibiting the wearing of 
headscarves in school, courtrooms, etc.  Left intellectuals quickly aligned for and 
against on distinct grounds:  either in defense of freedom of expression and 
against discrimination, or in defense of secularism (Libération, May 6, 7, and 23, 
2003; Le Monde, May 10 and 23, 2003).  The debate was complicated when it 
came to light that the President’s wife, Ms. Bernadette Chirac, had intervened 
with officials to allow a Catholic nun to keep her headdress on while being 
photographed for her driver’s license.  These developments also prompted 
initiatives designed to settle the matter once and for all.  The Minister of 
Education commissioned a report on secularism, which produced sixteen 
proposals; on June 4 the National Assembly established a committee of inquiry 
into the issue of religious signs in school, chaired by Jean Louis Debré, to report 
by early December; and on July 3, President Chirac appointed an Independent 
Commission on the Application of Secularism in the Republic, chaired by the 
government’s mediator, Bernard Stasi, to report by the end of the year, including 
on the advisability of a law prohibiting the wearing of religious signs in public   49
places,  notably schools and government offices (Le Monde, Oct. 27, 2003; New 
York Times, Oct. 8, 2003).  Although opponents of a law prohibiting the wearing 
of a scarf in school argued all along that this would violate not only the French 
constitution but also the European Convention on Human Rights, their position 
was severely undermined when, in a hearing before the Stasi Commission, the 
Vice-President of the Euroean Court declared that such a law would be judged 
as conforming to the French model of secularism, and thus not contrary to the 
European Convention, as the latter does not prescribe any specific model of 
relations between religion and the state, but admits all modes, from the French 
model to state religion as in Britain. Moreover, he insisted that if one wants to 
prohibits religious signs in school, then there has to be a law or a regulatory text 
to that effect (Le Monde, Oct. 28, 2003). 
In  conclusion, despite differences in the general principles governing 
church-state relatons in Western Europe, it is evident that Islamic institutions are 
unequal to those of the established or traditionally recognized religions (Sunier & 
Meyer 1997). In addition to structural constraints, for example, the principle of 
recognition as practiced in Germany and Belgium means that only religions 
meeting certain bureaucratic criteria have access to governmental facilities and 
funds; and Islamic bodies as constituted in those countries often fall short of 
them. The diversity of the Muslim umma and the complexities of religion insure 
that negotiations will not proceed evenly in all spheres, and in most cases, 
moderate Muslims have tended to remain silent, thereby contributing further to 
the impression that Islam is inherently and inescapably “fundamentalist”  (House 
1996).  
The U.S. situation is complicated by the fact that although Arab 
immigration started in the early decades of the twentieth century, it initially 
consisted overwhelmingly of Christians from Lebanon and Syria, who were quite 
easily incorporated into the mainstream –as indicated, for example, by the 
background of the present Secretary of Commerce and former senator of 
Michigan Spencer Abraham.  Islam subsequently arose as a religious movement 
among African Americans, but there was no significant Muslim immigration until   50
the policy reforms of the 1970s opened up immigration to Asians, notably 
Iranians and Pakistanis; this was largely paralleled in Canada as well.  But 
whereas Muslim migrants to Europe, especially on the Continent,  were drawn 
overwhelmingly from the peasantry or the working class, Muslim immigrants to 
the United States and Canada included a substantial proportion of educated 
professionals, whose religious life adapted quite easily to the established 
congregational pattern, derived originally from Protestantism (Bozorgmehr, et al. 
1996; Abu-Laban 1995; Metcalf 1996; Metcalf 1996).  In the 1980s, Muslims from 
a variety of ethnic groups quite easily founded congregations and opened up 
mosques without attracting much public attention.   
In the United States, the size of the Muslim immigrant population has 
recently become an object of controversy. Since “Muslim” denotes affililation to a 
religion and not a nationality or an ethnicity, it is not recorded by the decennial 
U.S. census, any more than is “Catholic,” “Protestant,” or “Jew.” In keeping with 
the common practice of U.S. ethnic groups to inflate their numbers for the 
purpose of political bargaining, the Arab-American Institute claims that persons of 
Arab ancestry total over three million; but ancestry responses on a recent census 
survey indicate that they number just over one million, of whom the largest 
groups are Lebanese, Egyptian, and Syrian, most of whom live in the Detroit, 
New York, and Los Angeles metropollitan areas.
9 An April 2001 report issued by 
the Council on American-Islamic Relations in Washington, D.C., stated that 2 
million were associated with a mosque, and estimated on that basis a total 
Muslim population of 6-7 million, of whom 33 percent are South Asian, 30 
percent African-American, and 25 percent Arab (Bagby, et al. 2001). However, 
the American Jewish Committee subsequently expressed concern that this 
meant Muslims outnumber Jews, and that “it would buttress calls for a 
redefinition of America’s heritage as ‘Judeo-Christian-Muslim, a stated goal of 
some Muslim leaders.” It therefore commissioned a report of its own, which 
criticized the Mosque Report for unsound methodology and  concluded that there 
are at most 2.8 million Muslims in the United States.
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Overall, although U.S. officials have not endorsed “multi-culturalism,” the 
United States undoubtedly provides the most anarchic (in the literal sense of un-
governed) setting among Western democracies for the launching of Muslim 
institutions.  Although there is no such thing as “official recognition” of religious 
bodies at either the state or federal levels, informal national recognition was in 
effect accorded in the United States by the White House on the occasion of the 
Id al Fitr in Spring 1996, when a family event, was held in the Old Executive 
Office Building, and First Lady Hilary Rodham Clinton said that the Eid [sic] was 
“an American event,” and that White House recognition of the holiday was 
“historic and overdue.” Invited guests included African American converts, as well 
as Muslims from the Middle East, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and elsewhere. 
According to Khaled Saffuri, assistant executive director of the American Muslim 
Council, Muslims had “asked before for recognition of the Eid, but our request 
always went unanswered.” He also said that the Clinton White House has been 
more welcoming to Muslims than any previous administration. (“The White House 
Recognizes Ramadan,” Washington Post, 24 February 1996: B7).  At a less 
solemn level, Muslim holidays, dietary requirements, and dress codes, were fairly 
easily “naturalized” in schools and in workplaces by way of the demands of 
African American adherents in the 1970s and 1980s, and also because they 
largely paralleled arrangements negotiated by Jews in the post-World War II 
period.  Muslims experience little or no difficulty in availing themselves of the 
opportunities open to religious organizations under the American version of 
separation of church and state --extending, for example, to the use of funds from 
foreign sources to construct and operate mosques or private schools; in effect, 
Islam is being processed by way of the flexible institutional apparatus that 
emerged from earlier confrontations with exogenous religions, Roman 
Catholicism and Judaism. 
However, the situation of Islam began to deteriorate in the wake of the first 
attack on the World Trade Center (1993), and worsened considerably following 
the second (2001), which triggered a spate of proposals to make the United 
States more secure against the enemy within by subjecting foreign residents to   52
systematic verification, especially “Arabs” and “Muslims.” Interpretations of the 
current conflict as a confrontation between a purified Islam and a decadent 
Judeo-Christianity that corrupts Muslims creates an uncomfortable dilemma for 
some American Muslims, as the special relationship between the United States 
and Israel has long done for most Arab-Americans. In the present climate, 
opinions that deviate from the accepted range might be construed as tacit or 
even active support for terrorist undertakings. Despite repeated injunctions by 
President Bush and other elected officials to avoid blaming groups wholesale, 
security measures taken by U.S. agents self-evidently entailed ethnic profiling. 
Under pressure from the press and civil liberties groups, Justice Department 
officials revealed in early November 2001 that they had detained 1,147 people in 
connection with the attacks, of whom over half had been released by the 
beginning of November; some were identified on the basis of circumstantial links 
with the attack, but many “were picked up based on tips or were people of 
MiddleEastern or South Asian descent who had been stopped for traffic 
violations of for acting suspiciously”.
11 The total included 235 people detained for 
immigration violations, mostly Arab or Muslim men, of whom 185 were still in 
custody. In response, a number of Arab and Muslim social and religious 
organizations broadened their functions to include the defense of civil rights 
(Mathur 2003). 
 
Language:  Overall, in the sphere of language, as against religion, contemporary 
immigration countries remain clustered close to the “assimilationist” pole rather 
than the “pluralist” or “multi-cultural” alternative.  A full-fledged “pluralist” 
alternative, which would involve acceptance by the hosts of the immigrant 
language(s) in public life, including both the economic and political spheres, 
thereby establishing the foundations for the emergence of a truly multi-lingual 
society, is nowhere to be found.  In fact, assimilationist policies are sometimes 
implemented even before arrival, for example by giving preference to applicants 
who know the host country’s language(s), as under the Canadian or Australian 
“point system,” –which has been advocated for the United States as well-- or as   53
France did with regard to Indochinese refugees. It should be noted that this also 
had other implications, notably with regard to class and education.  
As interpreted in most host countries, “freedom of speech” provides for the 
right of persons --including immigrants-- to use non-national languages in the 
private sphere, and today is also construed to prevent the state --in its 
incarnation as schoolteachers, for example-- from actively repressing their use by 
immigrants in public, as was done historically with many indigenous and regional 
linguistic groups (e.g., Saami, Native Americans, Bretons), as well as with earlier 
waves of immigrants  “for their own good.”  This freedom generally extends also 
to publications in non-national languages, which in the past were often subject to 
restrictions on security grounds and the like.  However, the situation with regard 
to electronic media is more ambiguous.  Because the state plays a leading role in 
allocating wavelengths or regulating the market for them, a place for minority 
languages has to be negotiated with the public authorities, as in the case of 
religion; for example, both Canada and Australia provide some broadcasts in 
immigrant languages as part of their multi-cultural incorporation policy (Inglis 
1997).  Beyond this, however, established practices have begun to change with 
the generalization of cable and the utilization of satellites, which in effect provides 
immigrants (and others) access to broadcasts and telecasts from the countries of 
origin. For example, a Europe-wide Turkish cable network has been under 
development since the late 1990s. 
The “pluralist” position occurs at most in a very limited form.  Examples 
include the provision of translators in specific situations, particularly where health 
and civil rights are at stake (hospitals, courts),  and/or the provision of selected 
public services in the immigrants’ languages in some localities of immigrant 
concentration.  With regard to the education of immigrant children (or who come 
from immigrant households), multi-culturalism is implemented by insuring that 
their home languages will be passed on to future generations, and by providing 
for their continuing development and expression in various art forms. However, 
the provision of mother-tongue facilities in education does not always indicate a 
commitment to “pluralism,” but may be part of a strategy to prevent settlement.    54
For example, in France, where language is highly emphasized as a marker of 
national identity, foreign-language education was provided to the children of 
immigrant workers in the 1970s as part of a policy to encourage their return; 
likewise, whereas Norway provides bilingual education for the children of 
ordinary immigrants to facilitate learning of the host language and incorporation 
more generally, Bosnian children taken in as “temporary protected persons,”  in 
the early 1990s were educated in their mother-tongue, thus emphasizing the 
likelihood of their repatriation. 
The newcomers’ objectives are usually more complex, ranging from quick 
learning of the host national language for economic pourposes, to maintaining 
their original language as a marker of identity and as a vehicle for community 
both within the host society and transnationally. What mild pluralism is 
encountered is instrumental from the perspective of the hosts : either to facilitate 
learning of the dominant language, or to deal with public safety and emergencies, 
or yet as an instrument of trade and foreign policy (e.g., Australia).  Nevertheless, 
while all “pluralist” positions are appreciated by immigrants, differences between 
“positive” and “negative” assimilationism matter greatly from their perspective. 
Every immigration country has been intent upon maintaining the status quo of the 
dominant language, and except for the French Canadians, who held the linguistic 
upper hand at the time of the British conquest but were unable to prevent the rise 
of English to paramountcy and subsequently had to struggle to reestablish 
French supremacy at the provincial level, has so far succeeded in doing so. 
In effect, whether or not knowledge of the hegemonic / official language is 
a formal requirement for political membership, newcomers are expected to learn 
and use it. By and large, the hosts expect massive “boundary crossing” by 
newcomers, with varying doses of the carrot or the stick in bringing this about.  
“Boundary blurring” tends to be very limited to the provision of emergency 
services and the like on what is expected to be a temporary basis. Against this 
background, the steady rise of Spanish as a widespread second language in the 
United States is a most unusual instance of broad-gauged “boundary blurring,”   55
and the possible transformation of its monolingual culture into a bilingual culture 
would constituted a unique case of “boundary shifting” in the linguistic sphere. 
Overall, in Europe, commitment to freedom of speech does not prevent 
democratic governments from insisting on the exclusive use of the national 
language(s) in its relations with the public; and it is noteworthy that the recent 
expansion of immigrant rights in many European countries has not extended to 
any requirement that the state make room for imported languages in the 
provision of public services, encompassing such vital institutions as the 
bureaucracy, the courts, or even public signs guiding traffic and the like. By and 
large, a similar situation prevails among the overseas immigration countries,  
including the United States.  However, the situation in the United States changed 
as a result of the civil rights revolution, which led to the acknowledgment of 
certain linguistic rights of U.S. minority citizens, and the resulting settlement 
contributed to modify processes governing the incorporation of the new wave of 
immigrants.  Thus, within the generally “assimilationist” linguistic world, there are 
significant variations, as illustrated by the cases of the United States and France.  
 
UNITED STATES:  Despite the absence of a formal national policy, 
English reigned unchallenged at the federal level from the founding onward and 
was imposed as a matter of course on non-English-speaking dependencies such 
as Indian reservations, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico (Fishman, et al. 1966). However, 
in the course of the nineteenth century states and local bodies often diverged 
from this norm in response to local conditions: Spanish was recognized in New 
Mexico’s constitution; numerous school boards provided a modicum of bilingual 
public education to their immigrant communities;  the widespread use of foreign 
languages in the press and private education was unquestioned;  language 
requirements for naturalization were minimal, if they existed at all; and foreign 
language ballots occasionally appeared as well to accommodate new citizens. 
German was particularly widespread among public institutions throughout the 
Midwest. However, hostility to the “new immigration” from eastern and southern 
Europe of the late nineteenth century triggered demands to restrict admissions   56
and to forcefully Americanize newcomers. The movement achieved considerable 
success in the wake of World War I, when German was in effect eradicated from 
the public sphere, including education. However, its triumph was limited by the 
Meyer v. Nebraska decision (1924), in which the Supreme Court ruled on due 
process grounds that states did not have the authority to prevent the teaching of 
foreign languages (Wexler 1996:346). Nevertheless, the educational community 
overwhelmingly supported unilingualism on pedagogic grounds. Notwithstanding 
acceptance of cultural pluralism in other spheres, an English-only regime 
prevailed throughout the country for the next half century, except for the 
recognition of Spanish as the language of Puerto Rico in the New Deal era. 
Policy changes, amounting to the elaboration of a mildly multilingual 
regime, were brought about by distinct developments in the post-World War II 
era: the civil rights movement; the massive importation of Mexican workers under 
the “Bracero” program (1942-1965); the enactment of a less restrictive 
immigration law in 1965; and the adoption of a generous policy toward refugees 
from the Communist world. The turning point was the Bilingual Education Act of 
1968, introduced on behalf of Spanish-speaking pupils in the Southwest, which 
added a Title VII to the first large-scale federal program in support of local 
schools enacted three years earlier. This provided a small demonstration 
program that was vastly expanded following the Lau v. Nichols decision (1974), 
in which the Supreme Court held the Civil Rights Act to mean that the failure to 
provide instruction in a language students can understand constitutes unlawful 
discrimination (Foster 1982:293). Advocates of bilingual education seized upon 
the case to press for the expansion of their programs, and a task force 
subsequently convened by the U.S. Office of Education to prescribe “Lau 
Remedies” placed bilingual education in a preferred position (Schmidt Sr. 2000; 
Leibowitz 1971; Leibowitz 1982). In the wake of these actions, as well as the 
continued flow of federal funding, bilingual education programs proliferated in a 
variety of forms, mostly designed to facilitate transition to English instruction, but 
with a minority dedicated to the maintenance of non-English mother tongues.    57
Additional federal programs were launched in the 1990s to remedy the 
deficiencies of earlier ones. 
Concurrently, a lobbying campaign initiated by the Mexican-American 
Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) to obtain coverage for language 
minorities under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 led to the addition in 1975 of Titles 
II and III, requiring that registration forms, ballots, and other election materials be 
provided in a language other than English if more than five percent of the voters 
in a given district spoke the same non-English language, and if the district’s 
English illiteracy rate surpassed the national average. Applicable to American 
Indians, Asian Americans, Alaskan Natives, and citizens of Spanish heritage, the 
legislation covered 384 counties.  Titles II and III were reauthorized in 1992 in 
strengthened form. Parallel developments occurred with regard to the language 
rights of defendants, as well as of employees in both the public and private 
sectors. In a dramatic reversal of past policy, in 1990 the Congress adopted the 
Native American Languages Act, which committed the United States to preserve 
and enhance its indigenous languages. The development of foreign-language 
media, especially Spanish, in response to market opportunities has also 
contributed to the normalization of a somewhat multingual societal configuration. 
Contrary to contentions that the new policies reduce incentives to learn 
English, research indicates that recent newcomers rapidly learn English and that, 
as with past waves, use of the country of origin’s language declines sharply in 
the second generation and almost disappears in the third (Stevens 1994; 
Espenshade & Fu 1997; Portes & Hao 1998). The steady shift to English is 
somewhat hidden from view because, by virtue of continuing immigration,  the 
number of American residents who used a language other than English at home 
rose from 23 million in 1980 to nearly 32 million in 1990, with Spanish accounting 
for slightly over half of the total. As of 2000, 17.9 percent of the U.S. population 5 
years and over spoke a language other than English at home, an increase of 
nearly one-third over 1990, with Spanish as by far the leading language (U.S. 
Census Bureau October 2003).   58
Not surprisingly, the dawning regime change provoked widespread 
opposition, often invoking the specter of conflict in multilingual countries such as 
Canada and Belgium (Petrovic 1997), and triggered moves to counteract the 
trend by officializing English at the state and national levels, as well as 
eliminating bilingual education. Hostility was especially high in California, which 
enacted several referenda to that effect, including Proposition 227 (1998) 
eliminating nearly all bilingual education; Arizona followed suit two years later. As 
against this, the American political system’s responsiveness to the rapid 
transformation of immigrants into electoral clienteles fostered support for the new 
regime. On balance, multilingualism of services is likely to persist, so long as 
substantial replenishment of foreign-language speakers by way of new 
immigration continues.  However, the future of bilingual education is less certain. 
As of 1997, the United States had approximately 3.5 million students with limited 
English proficiency (LEP), a  57 percent increase since the beginning of the 
decade; but they had higher rates of repetition and dropped out of school four 
times more frequently than their English-fluent peers (United States General 
Accounting Office 1999). Research findings regarding the effectiveness of 
various approaches to the education of LEP children, including the effects of the 
elimination of bilingual education in California in favor of “immersion,” were 
indecisive; but run of the mill transitional programs, many of which lacked 
qualified staff, were widely criticized for their ineffectiveness and possible 
perverse effects, notably fostering within-school segregation of newcomers. 
FRANCE: The fact that France is as much of an immigration country as 
the United States, with a similar proportion of foreign-born residents, has had 
little or no impact with regard to language in the public sphere. Albeit attributable 
in part to the fact that a majority of the immigrants originate in the Maghreb, 
where French is widespread both as a language of instruction and as a lingua 
franca, the absence of change largely reflects the lasting power of France’s 
assimilationist stance. No provisions have been made for public services in 
languages other than French, except to a limited extent with regard to court 
translators for the benefit of the accused. Bilingual education, even of a   59
transitional sort, does not exist; the only concession made to immigrant 
communities at the elementary level is to allow the teaching of “languages and 
cultures of origin” as an elective subject outside of regular school hours. In 1989-
90, attendance ranged from 13 percent for children of Algerian origin to 35 
percent for Turks (Tribalat, et al. 1996:188-213).  
However, in the face of new immigration flows from countries deemed “not 
to have any cultural links with France,” notably the former Soviet Bloc, 
Afghanistan, Turkey, Iraq, China, and English-speaking Africa, in 2002 the 
government elaborated a more proactive integration policy. This was to be 
founded on an “integration contract” to be entered in voluntarily by newcomers, 
which would include a commitment to take French courses –between 200 and 
600 hours, depending on budgetary decisions—as well as a 30-hour 
“apprenticeship” course on civic rights and obligations.  Upon completion of the 
“contract,” immigrants will be awarded a certificate that will facilitate applications 
for permanent residence and naturalization (Le Monde, October 18, 2002).  
 
Citizenship:  
Access to citizenship is a crucial feature of incorporation, as it provides 
formal membership in the receiving society.  Following the distinction elaborated 
by T. H. Marshall,  “citizenship” is a source of civil, social, and political rights, to 
which some would now add “cultural” rights, of which we have become much 
more conscious in the half century since Marshall formulated his 
conceptualization (Marshall 1950).  Among contemporary democratic societies, 
however, formal citizenship is not a requirement for the enjoyment of basic civil 
rights, which are in effect extended to all legal residents, a category which has 
evoked the revival of the term “denizen.” In the United States, for example, the 
post-Civil War constitutional tradition explicitly extends civil rights to “persons” 
rather than “citizens,” and this has led to the extension of certain rights to illegal 
residents as well.  This is largely the case with regard to “social” rights as well: 
legal residents generally enjoy the right to work, and concomitantly to collect 
unemployment insurance as well as most of the benefits provided by the welfare   60
state, in keeping with national variation. In some cases, denizens may even 
enjoy some political rights, notably that of participating in local elections –except 
where these are considered to constitute the first stage of a national election 
process. However, in all cases formal citizenship is requires for the exercise of 
political rights at the national level, and hence for effective participation in the 
democratic process.  Beyond this, formal citizenship is also a source of security, 
as statuses short of this, such as that provided by long-term residence 
authorizations, are usually conditional and subject to qualification or even 
revocation.  
“Nationality laws” take into consideration a mixture of diverse elements 
(Weil 2001): birthplace, ascendancy, marital status, place of residence.  
“Ascendancy” may refer to the legal nationality of parents or more remote 
relatives (e.g., grandparents), as well as to a country or human community of 
origin (as in the case of African Americans in the United States, who were 
granted citizenship after the Civil War on the basis of their African origins, while 
around the same time, Chinese were denied access to citizenship on the 
grounds of theirs). The attribution of nationality on the basis of birth in a territory 
over which the state currently maintains sovereignty is usually referred to as jus 
soli; on the basis of the nationality of one parent (sometimes limited to the 
father’s) is usually referred to as jus sanguinis. Weil has observed that where a 
population and a territory match eachother exactly, it would make no difference 
whether citizenship is attributed on the basis of the one or the other; in practice,  
the difference comes into play only when there is a disconnection, as is the case 
in the contemporary world generally, and especially in Western Europe and North 
America.   
Nationality laws also deal with the acquisition of citizenship by way of 
“naturalization”.  Here, there was traditionally a sharp contrast between self-
conceived “immigration countries,” which generally were eager to incorporate 
newcomers as fast as possible, and those that saw themselves as “ancestral 
lands,” where the process was generally complicated and often expensive 
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demanding conditions.  However, until recently, immigration countries also gave 
considerable attention to ancestry, in that most of them in effect imposed 
“whiteness” as a qualification for eligibility to naturalization. The case of the 
United States is somewhat paradoxical in this respect, as by virtue of the post-
Civil War constitutional amendments and legislation that extended citizenship to 
African Americans, persons of African descent could not be constitutionally 
excluded from naturalization; however, no such prohibition pertained to Asians, 
who were in fact kept out until well into the twentieth century. 
Nationality laws are shaped by juridical tradition (notably the distinction 
between “common law” of Britain and its overseas derivatives, and Roman law, 
notably as codified in modern form in “Napoleonic Code” countries); divergent 
nation-state building experiences; the role of immigration in the country’s history; 
and the presence of minorities.  Generally, regimes associated with jus soli “are 
presumed to be more inclusive and less ascriptive” than those associated with 
jus sanguinis, which is attributed “to the ethnic character of its framer’s 
conception of nationhood and to serve as a general expression of the state’s self-
understanding”, a contrast drawn between France and Germany (Brubaker 
1992).  But as Patrick Weil has pointed out,  such a generic explanation proves 
highly problematic when tested against the historical record of European and 
North American states. For example, although France emphasizes its strongly 
integrative republican identity, forged through its revolutionary experience, in fact 
the principle of  jus soli was associated with the feudal tradition, in that a person 
born on royal soil in effect “belonged” to the King; hence the Revolution shifted 
toward “jus sanguinis”, with no ethnic overtones but as an indication that “family 
links transmitted by the pater familias” –and for a long time, specifically not the 
mother!—“had become more important than subjecthood” (Weil 2001:20).  This 
conception remained dominant throughout most of the nineteenth century, and to 
this day, in France “soil” is in fact associated with the more ethnic conception of 
nationhood.  The reintroduction of jus soli in the mid-nineteenth century was 
intended primarily to in effect foist French citizenship on the children of long-term 
foreign residents, whose families avoided it because of the military draft   62
obligation this entailed (Weil 2001:28). The jus soli that prevails in the common 
law tradition is also derived from a feudal conceptualization of the nation as an 
organic entity constituted by the royal domain, and it can hardly be argued that 
the British concept of nationhood is an inclusive one.  That being said, it is self-
evident that where jus soli has become associated with a self-conceptualization 
as a “nation of immigrants,” it provides a signal advantage to the “second 
generation”. 
In practice, nationality laws usually involve a mixture of the two. For 
example, while the United States comes close to an ideal-typical “jus soli” 
situation, as it was enshrined into the constitution by way of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which grants U.S. citizenship to all persons born in territory under 
the jurisdiction of the federal government –a measure originally designed to grant 
citizenship to ex-slaves-- it also takes into consideration jus sanguinis, in that the 
child of an American citizen born outside U.S. territory is attributed U.S. 
citizenship by virtue of that parent’s status.  On the other hand, in France, jus 
sanguinis comes into play in the first instance, as the child of a French parent 
automatically is French, but jus soli  comes into play as well, as the children of 
non-French parents, but born on French soil, are granted easier access to the 
acquisition of French nationality, and the children of non-French parents, but who 
are themselves born on French soil, benefit from jus soli at birth. 
The onset of the post-World War II global immigration wave occasioned 
considerable change and adaptation on both sides of the Atlantic: 
UNITED KINGDOM:  In the course of negotiating the transformation of its 
empire into the Commonwealth, the United Kingdom in effect conceded to its 
former subjects freedom of entry and settlement in Britain.  Concurrently, it also 
recruited some colonials as guest workers, both to fill some shortages, and to 
reduce population pressures and unemployment that were thought to spawn 
radical political movements.  Together, these developments had the unforeseen 
consequence of occasioning a much larger immigration of Asians and West 
Indians than anticipated, which in turn fostered the precocious emergence of 
radical anti-immigrant movements and parties (notably the National Front). What   63
came to be considered as a severe problem  was compounded by the jus soli 
tradition, whereby all persons born in Britain automatically acquired British 
nationality. In response, the Conservative Party took the lead in moving British 
nationality law away from pure jus soli, and the Labour Party followed in its wake:  
the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962 and the Immigration Act of 1971 
placed limits to the freedom of entry of former colonials and created a distinct 
intermediate category, “patrials,” who benefited from a right of abode.  This was 
attributed to citizens of the United Kingdom or of the colonies provided that they 
were born, adopted, or registered in the territory of the United Kingdom, or had 
been residents for at least five years.  The 1981 legislation, responding to some 
extent as well to the realities of participation in the European Union,  created 
British citizenship. It automatically attributed jus soli to children born in the United 
Kingdom to a British citizen or to a non-British permanent resident born in the 
United Kingdom –somewhat on the French model; otherwise, a minor could 
acquire British citizenship if resident in the UK for ten continuous years.  In 
addition, British citizenship is automatically attributed through jus sangunis to the 
first generation born abroad, as in the United States and many other cases. 
However, in the next generation, the descendant of the British citizen loses 
British citizenship unless she settles in the United Kingdom (Hansen 1998). 
There has been convergence throughout continental Europe toward the 
“double jus soli” adopted by France in 1889, whereby the children of foreign 
nationals themselves born in France are automatically French citizens at birth. 
This was adopted by the Netherlands in 1953, Spain in 1990, and Belgium in 
1992. Straight-forward jus soli prevails in Ireland, and under conditions of legal 
residence in the United Kingdom and Portugal (if the parents have resided in 
Portugal for some years before the birth).  Beyond this, in Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden, a person born in the country for 
foreign parents can acquire citizenship upon reaching majority after fulfilling 
certain residency requirements.  In Spain, the parents can request naturalization 
of their locally-born child one year after birth.  Throughout the European Union, 
with the exception of Austria, Greece, and Luxemburg, access to citizenship for   64
the second or third generation has recently been facilitated as well. Even Austria 
has acknowledged the relevance of local birth, as applicants to naturalization 
who were born there may be naturalized after six years’ residence. 
GERMANY: Germany has usually been viewed as the case most resistant 
to movement away from jus sanguinis and this has been widely attributed to 
adherence to a conception of the nation that is itself founded on “blood,” i.e., 
ethnic. However, this is somewhat of a misunderstanding.  The prominence of jus 
sanguinis can be traced to its adoption by Prussia in 1842, when it was, as 
noted, the dominant principle of French law; it was demonstrably not ethnically 
motivated, as this bestowed full Prussian nationality on Prussians of Polish and 
Jewish ancestry. Incorporated into German law at the time of unification, the  
principle of jus sanguinis was further reinforced in 1913, largely to provide for the 
maintenance of German nationality among emigrants born of German parents in 
foreign countries, including the United States, rather than to exclude immigrants. 
Nevertheless, perceptions of Germany as an ethnically-founded nation were 
reinforced during World War I, and under the Nazi regime jus sanguinis was 
made to operate in a deliberately ethnic and racist manner.   
This was maintained after World War II, once again not in opposition to 
immigrants, but rather as a way of maintaining legal ties with East Germans and 
of incorporating the millions of ethnic Germans expelled from the Soviet-occupied 
territories in Central and Eastern Europe. However, as Germany evolved into 
somewhat reluctantly into an immigration country, this legal tradition emerged 
increasingly as an obstacle to the incorporation not only of newcomers, but 
especially of their German-born progeny.  It was only in the 1990s that Germany 
began to move toward what might now be considered the “European norm,” 
adopting in effect a version of “double jus soli.”  
Countries also vary with respect to the rights of resident aliens (Joppke 
2001). In the United States, two somewhat contradictory principles operate: on 
the one hand, the federal government has “plenary power” over all matters 
pertaining to the entry, stay, exclusion, and naturalization of immigrants; but on 
the other hand, resident aliens are on a par with citizens because they are   65
“persons.” Although Joppke has pointed out that “While the plenary power 
principle has never been officially rescinded by the Supreme Court, its legitimacy 
has grown thin over time” (Joppke 2001:40), legislation of 1996 as well as the 
post-9/11 “USA Patriot Act” have shifted the weight back somewhat in this 
direction (Cole 2003). On the other hand, in the 1970s the Supreme Court 
invoked the equal protection clause for “persons” of the Fourteenth Amendment 
in a number of cases, to strike down state laws that withheld welfare benefits 
from resident aliens and, most famously, to invalidate a Texas law that denied a 
free public school education to the children of illegal immigrants. However, in 
1994 the state of California adopted by way of a referendum Proposition 187, 
which denied most state services to illegal aliens, and the U.S. Congress 
subsequently enacted legislation in the same vein.  None of these has yet been 
fully tested in the courts. 
In Europe generally, the onset of large-scale permanent settlement by 
guest workers and the family reunion that ensued created pressures on behalf of 
legal reforms that guarantee permanent residence to long-term immigrants and 
facilitate their access to citizenship.  In the late 1970s the French Conseil d’État 
issued a negative opinion regarding the government’s attempt to forcibly 
repatriate the majority of legal North African immigrants in the late 1970s, and in 
1984 France enacted a law granting permanent residence to nearly all foreign 
workers and their families.  In the same vein, in Germany, “an austere and 
rudimentary Alien Law passed in 1965,” which granted no rights whatsoever to 
labor migrants, “went unreformed for twenty-five years”; nevertheless, during this 
period labor migrants did achieve a secure permanent resident status thanks to 
the intervention of “an aggressive federal constitutional court” which promoted 
the principle of incremental protection, i.e., protection increasing with the length 
of residence until full rights are achieved (Joppke 2001:45).  In 1990 Germany 
also adopted a new basic Foreigner law, which considerably facilitates access to 
the acquisition of German nationality, notably for the second generation. 
However, the trend has not been uni-directional.  For example, in the 
1990s Germany embarked on a new round of guest worker recruitment, now   66
from eastern and central Europe, which are specifically designed from the outset 
to prevent aliens from remaining in Germany long enough to benefit from this 
incremental system.  Other affluent countries as well are once again seeking “to 
have their cake and eating it too,” in the sense of trying to secure the benefits of 
foreign workers without allowing them to secure the full rights of citizens and the 
benefits such a status affords. 
In another sphere,  a particularly notable development has been 
movement toward much greater latitude for the acquisition of multiple 
nationalities: “In a perfectly symmetrical world each individual citizen or national 
is a member of one and only one state. In the past many political theorists and 
legal scholars have imagined such a world. They denounced the very idea of 
dual nationality as unnatural and likened it to a bigamous marriage. Today, 
defenders of postnational and transnational understandings of political 
membership see in the phenomenon of dual nationality the harbinger of a new 
world, one no longer dominated by the nation-state” (Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer 
2001:63). In the United States, for example, it is estimated than more than half a 
million children born each year have at least one additional nationality; another 
estimate suggests that 60 percent of Swiss nationals who live abroad are dual 
nationals; and in Australia the number of dual nationals may reach five million.  
Overall, there has been a noticeable shift on the part of states from their 
traditionally restrictive stance toward a more open or at least tolerant one.  This is 
in part a concomitant of the more general strengthening of women’s rights, 
enabling them to keep their nationality upon marriage and to pass it on to their 
children; but it also undoubtedly reflects also the passing of the era of mass 
armies, when male military service was viewed as a primary obligation of 
citizenship.  A major concern preventing full acceptance of multiple nationalities 
is concern over its consequences for voting: for example, if the country in which 
the dual citizens are  not residing permits absentee voting, then they are entitled 
to vote in two sets of national electons; another is that they may “vote the 
interests” of one of their countries in the other (Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer 2001:80).  
But it is by no clear in what way, if any, the possession of two votes harms   67
democracy; and as with regard to the second of these concern, Aleinikoff and 
Klusmeyer point out quite appropriately that mononationals may also have a 
special concern with another state. 
 
Conclusion: The Paradoxes of Globalization 
 
While much of the concern over the effects of globalization rightly focuses 
on its contribution to loss of identity by way of the steady spread of a 
manufactured commercial culture which threatens to swamp the legacy of 
diverse human experiences and undermines the survival of these rich multi-
faceted cultures, globalization is also contributing to the transformation and 
enrichment of cultures that, throughout much of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, were elaborated in the service of competing and often mutually hostile 
national states.   
In the past few decades, in much of Europe and North America, national 
states have relinquished much of the repressive control they long exercised on 
some of the residual regional cultures that diverged from the national standard. In 
a number of cases, this has been accompanied by political decentralization, 
providing in effect an unprecedented degree of self-governance in the cultural 
sphere. Within the European Union, there has even arisen the possibility of a 
rapprochement between related cultural regions hitherto separated by state 
boundaries.  
Concurrently, globalization has contributed to the unprecedented mobility 
of world population (Castles & Davidson 2000).  While much of this movement is 
attributable to political or economic necessity, and largely reflects the world’s 
structured inequality, it nevertheless has the overall effect of reducing the 
exclusivity of “national belonging” fostered by the dynamics of the modern 
international system.  This has brought about the dawn of cosmopolitan 
denizenship, whereby human beings within their own country or abroad are 
endowed with a modicum of basic rights (Zolberg 2000).  Although these rights   68
are obviously not universally respected, it is nevertheless the case that they are 
acknowledged to an unprecedented extent. 
“Denizenship” has come to be recognized as a distinctive status on both 
sides of the Atlantic, and overall, access to citizenship has been significantly 
facilitated.  Thus, in the area of citizenship, boundaries have in effect become 
less rigid, thereby facilitating individual crossing –providing individuals with 
choice.  At the same time, the “price” of such crossing has been lowered, in that 
individuals are in effect no longer required to give up their prior nationality in 
order to do so.  In the sphere of culture, the situation is more mixed.  With regard 
to language, in effect “boundary crossing” retains the upper hand; however, 
some concessions are made here and there to the preservation of ancestral 
languages, and in the case of the United States, immigration is producing 
unprecedented movement away from the insistent monolingualism that was long 
seen as a central requirement for national integration –tantamount to boundary 
shifting. 
But when all is said and done, the most significant consequence of 
globalization in the cultural sphere is the loosening of the boundaries that have 
separated world religions.  These boundaries were not an happenstance 
development, but rather the result of deliberate century-long political efforts on all 
sides.  Although only Islam has been considered here, because of its prominence 
in current affairs of state on both sides of the Atlantic, is must be noted that 
similar developments have occurred with respect to other “non-European” 
religions.  While unease, fears, and even hostility towards Islam in general are 
not likely to disappear in the near future, the interpenetration of hitherto mutually 
suspicious civilizations also provides an unprecedented opportunity for finding or 
establishing common ground.  It must be recognized, however, that from the 
perspective of the receiving societies, this amounts to a genuine boundary shift, 
and that such an experience is always traumatic, generating undesirable side 
effects, notably aggressive reactions and negative movements.  It is evident that 
both European and North American societies are currently in such a transitional   69
phase, and hence that manifestations of resistance to change should be 
understood as indications that change is in fact proceeding apace.  
With regard to citizenship, somewhat contradictory overall trends are 
observable. On both sides of the Atlantic, most civil and social rights traditionally 
associated with citizenship have been gradually extended to legal, permanent 
foreign residents {Feldblum 2000}.  This globalization of human rights constitutes 
a significant countertrend to the “nationalization of human rights” Hannah Arendt 
considered as laying the groundwork for totalitarianism {Zolberg 1994}. However, 
this is much less the case with regard to political participation, which with minor 
exceptions tends to be reserved for formal holders of a country’s nationality. 
There has also been a general trend toward more inclusive nationality policies, 
facilitating its acquisition by long-term residents and especially by children born in 
the country. However, the increased mobility of the world’s population and 
concern with legal immigration has also prompted a number of traditional jus soli 
states to qualify this by limiting it to the children of legal permanent residents. 
Last but not least, affluent states continue to make use of foreign workers, whose 
economic profitability is founded in effect on the possibility of preventing their 
access to citizenship.  As economic globalization proceeds apace, this will 
emerge as an increasingly important source of inequity unless it is dealt with at 
the level of the international community. 
Finally, while the discussion in this essay has focused on processes at the 
national level, in fact the countries in question have never been self-contained, 
and are if anything much less so today.  On the European side in particular, 
negotiations regarding the management of old and new differences are taking 
place within the framework of the European Union as well as of the broader one 
provided by the Council of Europe, both of which to some extent mitigate 
narrower national dispositions.  While no equivalent transnational framework has 
emerged in North America, Canada, the United States, and Mexico are in fact 
moving toward economic integration, and the population movements between 
Mexico and the United States are of such  magnitude as to foster, willy nilly, the 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 Part of this paper is drawn from an earlier article co-authored with Long Litt 
Woon (Zolberg & Long 1999). 
  
2 But the fact that most of the latecomers had more heterogeneous linguistic 
configurations than Western Europe during the equivalent period of state-
formation rendered the pursuit of uniformity illusory. 
3.The relative decline in the proportions of recent immigrants from Europe is 
further emphasized when we take into consideration emigration from the United 
States: persons from Europe have the highest propensity to leave the U.S., and 
persons from Asia the lowest (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990).   
4 Let us not forget that hundred of thousands of persons in Germany, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Italy, and Greece would today 
trace their ancestry to immigrants from eastern Europe had it not been for the 
mass murder of Jews by the Nazis, which also prompted many of the survivors to 
emigrate to Israel or overseas. 
5.According to governmental figures on immigration submitted in 1995 by 19 
Council of Europe countries, Muslims are followed by Roman Catholics (over 900 
000), Buddhists (over 400 000) and Hindus (over 390 000).   
6.This is largely inspired from the framework set forth by Rainer Bauboeck. 
However, whereas his framework emphasizes boundry crossing and boundary 
blurring, Long and I have added “boundary shifting,” and extended the whole set 
of concepts to all parties involved, both newcomers and hosts.  
7 This corresponds to the “differentialist model” discussed by Christine Inglis 
(Inglis 1997:23). 
8.A further distinction can be made between legal and social boundaries. Whilst 
newcomers might be accepted as formal members of the polity e.g. through 
naturalization, they might still be held at arm=s length as not being  Areal@ co-
nationals. A case in point is that of an immigrant who has acquired citizenship in 
a Western European country , but is not viewed by respectable and well-informed 
persons as a “real” European. 
9 “Census had a variety of categories, but none tallied Arab or Muslims,” by 
Nicholas Kulish, The Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2001; The New York 
Times, October 15, 2001, B10 (according to Jon Alterman, Middle East specialist 
at the U.S. Institute of Peace). 
   79
                                                                                                                                  
10 “Jewish group says estimates of U.S. Muslim population are too high,” by 




11 The New York Times, November 3, 2001: B1. This was raised from 1,017 
reported a few days earlier (The New York Times, October 30, 2001:B1).  